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USING PARROTS TO KILL MOCKINGBIRDS: YET




With the publication of Nelle Harper Lee's timeless classic
To Kill a Mockingbird' in 1960, "the lyrical songbird of the title
had strong competition as critics and readers worldwide sang
the praises of the young Alabama author and her (first and only
to date) remarkable novel."2 Critics heralded Mockingbird as
"the best first novel of the year" and "a first novel of... rare
excellence."3 Several major book clubs, including the Literary
Guild and Reader's Digest, selected it as their feature.' Critics
called Harper Lee a "fresh writer with something significant to
say, South and North."5 The following year, Lee won the presti-
gious Pulitzer Prize for fiction;' and, in 1962, a movie based on
the novel received an Academy Award.7
Of all the praise Lee has received, she is most proud of
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1. HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
2. Southern Living Gallery, Editor's Note to HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKIaNG-
BIRD 3 (Oxmoor House, Inc. 1982) (1960) (contains a summary of many of the ear-
liest literary critiques of the novel).
3. Id. at 3.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. at 3.
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Mockingbird's reception throughout the South.8 Readers could
not resist attempts to identify every character in their own small
towns from Alabama to Texas. And, even for readers outside the
South, the book had a universality and authenticity that cap-
tivated them and made it an international bestseller.
The novel and the film were enormous commercial success-
es.' Undoubtedly, the racial milieu of the 1950s and 1960s had
much to do with their success. Racial bias and antagonism were
then at the forefront of public consciousness and many Ameri-
cans, Black and non-Black, could no longer reconcile national
pronouncements of freedom and equality with apartheid in the
United States.'0
When Lee published Mockingbird, the codified and custom-
ary second-class citizenship of Blacks in the United States was
under attack in education, voting, housing, employment, and
public accommodations. Just the mention of school integration,
interracial sex or marriage, or voting rights for Blacks caused a
lynch-mob atmosphere, and in many American cities, including
Birmingham, Selma, Montgomery, Tuscaloosa, Anniston, Jack-
son, Oxford, and Little Rock, White resistance to change was
cruel and swift."
What is the reader to make of Lee's novel today, after three
decades of additional civil rights legislation? Is the book simply
a love story?' 2 Or does Lee intend her readers to think about
8. Id. at 4.
9. Some reports state that Mockingbird has sold over 30 million copies. See
Linda Grant, In Search of Harper Lee, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 15, 1991, at 36.
10. See generally THE EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTs READER (Clayborne Car-
son et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter EYES ON THE PRIZE] (containing documentary
evidence of the civil rights struggle in the United States between 1954 and 1990).
There is also a 14-part videocassette series that parallels EYES ON THE PRIZE.
11. Alabama was one of several Southern states that became the stage for the
most decisive and shocking confrontations of the civil rights movement. When the
national networks showed the world the face of racism,* they showed the vicious
attacks on Blacks at Kelly Ingrain Park and the Edmund Pettus Bridge. The images
of Jim Clark and Eugene "Bull" Connor and their baton-wielding policemen, police
dogs tearing at the clothing of demonstrators, and the pummeling of American
citizens with fire hoses and tear gas shocked the conscience of the nation. See EYES
ON THE PRIZE, supra note 10, at 147-62, 204-27.
For an informative discussion of riots in Tuscaloosa in response to the enroll-
ment of Autherine Lucy, and later, Vivian Malone and James Hood at the Universi-
ty of Alabama, see E. CULPEPPER CLARK, THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR 71-91, 213-37
(1993).
12. Lee described the book as a love story, pure and simple. Southern Living
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how, if one is Black, one's race can negatively influence treat-
ment within the criminal justice system? Does she defend the
folks who control the dispensation of unequal justice? Whatever
her intentions, in Mockingbird Lee writes about the paradigm
racial prosecution in which a Black male is accused of raping a
White female and an all-White jury convicts the defendant based
on weak, circumstantial evidence or in the face of substantial
contradictory evidence.
While Lee's prosecution is fictional, there has never been
any shortage of similar prosecutions. One of the nation's most
celebrated racial prosecutions occurred in 1931 in Scottsboro,
Alabama.13 What had begun as a complaint by several White
hobos who alleged they had been thrown from a train by several
Blacks, escalated into allegations of rape by two White women
also riding on the train. The women alleged that the nine
Blacks, ages thirteen to twenty, had boarded the freight train in
northeast Alabama, fought with and thrown several White hobos
off the train, and then raped them. 4
Some commentators have speculated that Harper Lee used
the Scottsboro Case as a model for the trial in Mockingbird.5
The same form of hysteria and hatred directed at the Scottsboro
Gallery, supra note 2, at 3.
13. See DAN T. CARTER, SCOTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH
(1979). The Scottsboro Case was a series of litigations that resulted in convictions
and death sentences for eight of the nine defendants. Id. at 48. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the initial convictions because the defendants had not had
appointed counsel assigned well in advance of their trial. Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932). Later, the Court invalidated another conviction because Blacks had
been systematically excluded from the jury. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
In a subsequent trial, defense lawyers presented persuasive testimony from several
witnesses, including Ruby Bates, one of the alleged victims, who recanted earlier
statements that a rape had occurred. CARTER, supra, at 204-34. Nonetheless, the
jury of 12 White men deliberated for only five minutes before voting to convict. For
the remaining 12 hours of deliberation, the jurors debated whether to impose a sen-
tence of death or life imprisonment. CARTER, supra, at 239-40. They selected death
by the electric chair. CARTER, supra, at 239. During several additional appeals, the
Scottsboro Boys, as the defendants became known, spent a total of 104 years in
prison for an alleged crime that probably never occurred. CARTER, supra, at 413.
14. For a concise discussion of the Scottsboro Case, see Dan T. Carter, A Rea-
sonable Doubt, in 8 RACE, LAW, & AMERICAN HISTORY 1700-1990, at 16-27 (Paul
Finkelman ed., 1992) (an 11-volume anthology of scholarly articles).
15. See, e.g., Claudia Johnson, The Secret Courts of Men's Hearts: Code and Law




defendants and their lawyers during that litigation appears in
several parts of Mockingbird. However, there have been so many
similar racial prosecutions, especially in the Southeast, that it
seems unnecessary to attribute Lee's story to a specific case. It
is more important to underscore that many such defendants
never made it to court, but instead were summarily shot or
lynched; and, if the defendant did receive a trial, it was conduct-
ed in the face of threats, intimidation, and mob violence. 6 The
racial animus that infected Lee's fictional prosecution lives be-
yond the novel and influences the kind of justice that is avail-
able to criminal defendants. Thus, Mockingbird rings familiar as
an illustration of the injustice of White racism and how it cor-
rupts access to criminal justice for Blacks.
One cannot read Mockingbird without contemplating how
many innocent persons have been falsely convicted and con-
demned to die or sentenced to long prison terms because of ra-
cial animus by police, prosecutors, jurors, or judges. While racial
animus is by no means the only type of misconduct that impedes
judicial fairness, as Justice Anthony Kennedy has written, it
"mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea
of democratic government from becoming a reality."7 The
wrongful conviction of Walter McMillian, formerly a pulpwood
worker in Harper Lee's hometown of Monroeville, Alabama, is a
recent illustration of how racial animus continues to infect crim-
inal investigations, prosecutions, penalties, and appeals in plac-
es like Maycomb. 8
The purpose of this Essay is to provoke discussion regarding
the persistence of racial animus in the criminal justice system. A
further purpose is to identify ways that we can ensure law en-
forcement officials, lawyers, judges, and jurors check racial ani-
mus at the courthouse door.
To help explain my concerns in writing this Essay, I offer
16. See WILLIAM B. HUIE, WOLF WHISTLE AND OTHER STORIES 8-16 (1959). For
two collections of scholarly articles -on lynching in the United States, see RACIAL
VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES (Allen 0. Grimshaw ed., 1969) and 9 RACE, LAW,
AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700-1990 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992).
17. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991).
18. McMillian v. State, 570 So. 2d 1285 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), appeal denied,
594 So. 2d 1253 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), remanded, Ex parte McMillian, 594 So. 2d
1288 (Ala.), McMillian v. State, 594 So. 2d 1289 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), rev'd, 616




Suppose that a White defendant is indicted for robbery and
murder of an eighteen-year-old Black woman in one of the pre-
dominantly Black towns in Alabama. The crime is a capital of-
fense in Alabama punishable by death. Suppose further that most
of the police investigators, the prosecutor, all but one member of
the jury, and the judge in the case are Black. And, suppose the
prosecutor removed other potential White jurors from the jury
venire by peremptory strikes. Finally, suppose that almost all of
the prosecution witnesses are Black and that most of the
defendant's alibi witnesses are relatives or long-time friends. 9
Do you think the White defendant in this hypothetical
would receive a fair trial, free of racial animus? I think for many
readers the reaction would be one of presumptive unfairness. I
believe many people are skeptical of the ability of Blacks, wheth-
er police officers, prosecutors, jurors, or judges, to act fairly to-
wards a White defendant. Perhaps the skepticism derives from a
fear that Blacks will use any opportunity presented to seek
vengeance against Whites for past and continuing wrongs. Such
skepticism and lack of trust that Blacks can set their passions
aside would undoubtedly serve as a basis for challenging the
trial's locatiori, the racial composition of the jury, or the selection
of a judge.
However, the above hypothetical would be a most rare oc-
currence in this country. There are very few jurisdictions in
which Blacks control the criminal justice process. Yet this hypo-
thetical is commonplace for Black defendants, and there is
sparse discussion regarding the fairness of such White-dominat-
ed prosecutions. Why are we not openly skeptical of the ability
of White police, prosecutors, jurors, and judges to act fairly to-
19. I designed this hypothetical after learning the facts of McMillian's case and
after another reading of Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that
the exclusion of Blacks from sitting on juries violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
Justice Strong wrote that
fi]f in those States where the colored people constitute a majority of the
entire population a law should be enacted excluding all white men from jury
service, thus denying them the privilege of participating equally with the
blacks in the administration of justice, we apprehend no one would be heard
to claim that it would not be a denial to white men of the equal protection of
the laws.
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
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wards a Black defendant? Why do we presume Whites can be
fair in situations that we presume Blacks could or would not? I
do not intend these questions as rhetorical. Part of my hope is
that we might lay bare the presence of racial animus and the
reality of racial dominance in our criminal justice system.
It is misguided to believe that White folks can discard
strongly held negative attitudes about Blacks when Whites act
as police, jurors, lawyers, or judges in criminal cases with a
Black criminal defendant. Additionally, I think Blacks hold sub-
stantial antipathy towards and mistrust of Whites, whether in
the role of lawyer, juror, judge, or defendant. And because racial
polarization is so significant in our society, our criminal justice
system cannot operate evenhandedly unless neither Whites nor
Blacks have principal control over criminal investigations, the
decision to indict or prosecute, jury selection, instructions to the
jury, sentencing, or the appellate process.2"
Once we admit racial animus into the courtroom, we aban-
don the presumption of innocence standard that is supposedly
central to our jurisprudential traditions. As a result, our crimi-
nal justice system loses its integrity. To eliminate racial animus
from our criminal justice system, we must first acknowledge its
presence and prevalence. Then, we must design new rules and
policies that eradicate it from the criminal justice system, root
and branch. We need rules that severely punish any agent of the
criminal justice system who engages in conduct that taints pros-
ecutions with racial animus. We currently do not take seriously
enough the type of injustice portrayed in Mockingbird and il-
lustrated alarmingly by wrongful convictions similar to Walter
McMillian's.
In Part Two of this Essay, I recall and react to Mocking-
bird."' I explain why the book is at once exhilarating and dis-
quieting. I also explore how conflicting conceptions of law are
applied depending on the race of the accused and the race or
20. For a persuasive contemporary argument that racial prejudice still influences
jury deliberations, see Sheri L. Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1616-51 (1985) (describing the persistent influence of race in
determinations of guilt through the examination of observations and statistics from
real criminal trials, results of mock jury experiments, and conclusions from general
research on racial prejudice).
21. See infra notes 28-86 and accompanying text.
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class of the alleged victim. In cases where the defendant is
Black and the alleged victim is White, a positivistic view of the
law is employed by police, prosecutors, judges, and jurors. Under
this view, the law is fixed and binds agents of the criminal jus-
tice system to a certain course of conduct. However, when the
accused is White and the victim is non-White or poor, a natural
law theory is applied in a manner that gives police, prosecutors,
judges, and jurors recourse to an independent, higher authority
instead of a fixed set of rules. This natural law framework en-
ables agents of the criminal justice system to exercise discretion
that usually is unavailable under a positivistic view of law.'
These conceptual phenomena permeate Maycomb as crafted by
Lee and the large and small cities and towns that we call home.
In Part Three, I comment on the work of others who have
documented the hundreds of cases in which innocent persons
have been falsely or wrongfully accused, convicted, or con-
demned for crimes they did not commit.' I also briefly review
the Supreme Court's erratic and confusing statements concern-
ing racial discrimination within the criminal justice system that
culminate in the Court's five to four decision in McCleskey v.
Kemp.
2A
In Part Four, I summarize the events which caused Walter
McMillian to spend six years of his life on Alabama's Death Row
for a crime that prosecutors now say he did not commit.' I ar-
gue that McMillian was convicted because of police and prose-
cutorial misconduct and because he is Black and the victim was
White. But for the work of the Alabama Capital Representation
Resource Center, McMillian probably would have been execut-
ed.'
In Part Five, I propose that additional laws be enacted to
provide greater legal and investigative resources to protect the
criminally accused, to punish police and prosecutorial miscon-
22. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 87-112 and accompanying text.
24. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). See infra notes 113-65 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 166-350 and accompanying text.
26. Since 1988, the Alabama Capital Representation Resource Center, which is
located in Montgomery, Alabama, has provided indigent postconviction capital defen-
dants with appellate legal assistance. It was instrumental in reversing Walter
McMillian's conviction and death sentence.
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duct, and to limit perjury; I also propose limiting the discretion
of jurors and judges in capital cases.27
II. To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD
Although Lee has disclaimed that her novel is autobio-
graphical, it is quite clear that she had firsthand knowledge of
her subject. The principal characters in Mockingbird resemble
those persons in Lee's family and community who likely had the
most significant influence on her. Additionally, Lee writes from
the perspective of an insider. She knows about small Southern
towns and what life was and is like there for children and
adults. Moreover, a close reading of the book reveals that Lee is
quite familiar with law, not just as a set of rules but, as James
Boyd White has written, as a complex language or culture.'
Lee's training in law at the University of Alabama, her adora-
tion of her father and his profession, and her research for the
book all contribute to the book's effectiveness as literature about
the peculiarities of the American criminal justice system, espe-
cially when race is a factor.'
Even today, Mockingbird remains one of the best and most
important books I have ever read. What gives this short book its
special status is Lee's exceptional ability to write about race,
gender, and class conflicts with a realism that makes the charac-
ters and stories seem familiar. Maycomb County could have
been in Florida, Georgia, the Carolinas, Tennessee, Mississippi,
Arkansas, Texas, or a number of other states. It could be in
many states today.
In Mockingbird, Lee explores several themes: how children
learn racial bias or racial tolerance through family and envi-
ronment, how boys and girls are socialized differently, how men
frequently (but not always) consciously and unconsciously domi-
nate women, the customary and pervasive second-class citizen-
ship of Blacks, the intersectionality of race, class, and gender
27. See infra notes 351-63 and accompanying text.
28. See .JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION xxxi (1973) (discussing "the
professional language of law").
29. Lee was enrolled at the University of Alabama between 1945 and 1949. She
left before completing her law degree to become a writer. See Southern Living Gal-
lery, supra note 2, at 10-12.
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hierarchies, and how racial attitudes influence the meaning and
application of legal canons such as the presumption that a de-
fendant is innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt through judicial proceedings. 0
For Lee, the legal system is not just rules or canons, it is
also the people who control and implement them. In Mocking-
bird and throughout much of this country, the people who con-
trol and implement rules of criminal justice are White. Thus, the
book is provocative because it challenges the reader to think
about how, within a White-controlled criminal justice system,
one's race can influence determinations of guilt or innocence, the
penalty sought by the prosecution, or the sentence imposed by a
jury or judge.3'
Mockingbird reflects the prevailing political, social, and
economic relationships in the United States. Maycomb resembles
our contemporary communities: it is segregated, White men
have most of the wealth and influence, women
disproportionately maintain the domestic sphere, and an unbe-
lievable percentage of Black men are under the control of the
criminal justice system.32 Therefore, its pages are teeming with
moral symbolism and contradiction, both sharpened by the ubiq-
uity of racial animus and caste. After yet another reading, this
author is left wondering whether equal justice or fair play in the
criminal justice system is marked "for [a few] Whites only."
Lee's novel also illustrates the intersectionality of race,
gender, and class subordination not only significant during the
Depression, but also present today.'m Thus, one has the impres-
30. Every criminal defendant who pleads not guilty supposedly enters our courts
with a presumption of innocence. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
31. Professor Johnson discusses not only the disproportionate conviction of
Blacks that occurs in a majority White community, but also the disproportionate
acquittal of Whites in cases in which Blacks are convicted. See Johnson, supra note
20, at 1616-18.
32. In 1989, 25% of all Black males between the ages of 20 and 29 were in
prison or under the supervision of the criminal justice system. Matt O'Conner, 29%
of Young Black Men Jailed in '89, Study Says, CHI. TAIB., Sept. 23, 1990, at Al.
33. See, e.g., KAREN B. MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN
AMERICA 1638 TO THE PRESENT 143-72, 248-50 (1986) (describing the exclusion of
women from the legal profession and legal education and the status of women in the
1994] 411
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sion from Lee that in Maycomb, no matter how prominent a
woman was, she was still subordinate to men, and no matter
how prosperous a Black was, he or she was still in some ways
subordinate to the poorest Whites.
Mockingbird is a collection of stories set during the early
1930s and narrated by Jean Louise (Scout) Finch, the six-to-
nine-year-old rough, self-styled tomboy who reflects on the
events leading up to a violent attack on her and her brother,
Jeremy Atticus (Jem) Finch, by the hateful and vindictive Rob-
ert E. Lee (Bob) Ewell, which left Jem's arm permanently disfig-
ured. Scout is a rip-roaring storyteller. Her recollections are
exhilarating and transport the reader through a broad spectrum
of emotions. Few books have made me laugh so heartily and
then feel so despondent.
Refreshingly, the characteristics exhibited by Scout are not
at all like those we are conditioned to expect in a girl her age
growing up in rural Alabama. She is assertive, inquisitive, ag-
gressive, and knows how to fight. She has confidence and self-
esteem. She does not allow gender stereotyping to prevent her
from thinking for herself and questioning authority, including
male authority. Scout is as dynamic and interesting as the sto-
ries she relates.
One story is about Scout's family: her father, her brother,
the woman who raises her and Jem, and her best childhood
friend. Atticus Finch, a member of the state legislature and a
local attorney, is Scout's widower father (her mother had died of
a sudden heart attack when she was two).'
As a father, Atticus is satisfactory and attentive.' A part
of Scout's story is about how he instilled important values in his
children. So, after Scout's traumatic first day at school leaves
her disliking her teacher and not wanting to return, Atticus
explains that she has to return and that she can never really
understand a person until she considers things from the person's
point of view by climbing into the person's skin and walking
profession today); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139-52 (arguing that contemporary discussions of
antidiscrimination policy treat race and gender as mutually exclusive).
34. LEE, supra note 1, at 10-12.




Calpurnia (Cal) is the Black domestic who is the surrogate
mother to Scout and Jem. It is clear that she is an essential part
of the Finch home and that it could not operate a single day
without her.37 Cal oversees all the household operations while
Atticus is working, and she provides Scout and Jem a window
into the lives of Negroes who live in a settlement on the outside
of town near the town dump. On limited occasions, Cal shows
Scout and Jem what it is like to be Black in Maycomb. They
acknowledge not only the differences in Cal's church," for ex-
ample, but also how Cal speaks another form of English when
she talks to some Blacks.39 Scout and Jem also learn that some
Blacks prefer to maintain separate institutions and to exclude
Whites; they learn that racial exclusion policies hurt the feelings
of those who are excluded.40
Finally; there is Charles Baker (Dill) Harris, Scout's diminu-
tive best friend from Meridian who spends his summers in
Maycomb: Dill is puzzling because he does not have a father, but
his father is not dead.4' Through Dill, Scout and Jem have a
window into the world of a peer from a broken home who is
shuffled among relatives during summer vacations. Scout and
Dill are also sweethearts, and his letters to Scout assure her
that once he is old enough and has the money, he will return to
Maycomb for her.42
One Christmas, Scout and Jem receive pellet guns as gifts.
With their presents, they receive explicit instructions that
Atticus would prefer them to shoot tin cans, but he is sure they
will instead shoot birds. Therefore, he tells them they can shoot
all the bluejays they can hit, but to remember it is a si to kill a
mockingbird because mockingbirds do nothing but make mu-
sic.'
The most significant story regards the trial and conviction of
36. LEE, supra note 1, at 36.
37. LEE, supra note 1, at 31.
38. LEE, supra note 1, at 134 (Scout and Jem are shocked when the congrega-
tion begins "lininm' the hymns).
39. LEE, supra note 1, at 129.
40. LEE, supra note 1, at 128-29.
41. LEE, supra note 1, at 13-14.
42. LEE, supra note 1, at 126.
43. LEE, supra note 1, at 98.
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Tom Robinson, a Black man who is accused of beating and rap-
ing Mayella Ewell, a White woman. Scout tells us that while the
local judge would usually assign such a case to a new, inexperi-
enced member of the bar, in this case the judge assigned the
case to Atticus." Implicit in this break from custom is the sug-
gestion that the judge had an agenda, presumably to help Tom.
The reader is left wondering why so significant a case, in which
a person's life is at stake, would customarily be assigned to
inexperienced counsel. Again, Lee demonstrates that she knows
of what she writes. In many of the cases regarding wrongful
convictions discussed below, one of the common features is inex-
perienced defense counsel who are paid very little compensation
for their work.45
Like the mockingbirds they are directed not to disturb,
Scout, Jem, and Dill are innocent children spending their sum-
mers at the edge of permissible play when Atticus's work causes
some of their neighbors to direct their ire first at him and then
at Scout and Jem. While Scout and Jem do not appear to share
the racial bigotry of many of the adults, it is so ubiquitous that
they do not emerge unaffected. It is left to Atticus to explain to
them why their sanguine existence in Maycomb has been shat-
tered.
Atticus explains to Scout and Jem that simply by the nature
of the work, every lawyer gets at least one case in his or her
lifetime that affects him personally." Atticus knows that people
in Maycomb will not be sympathetic to Tom or to him and that
Scout and Jem will see the evil ways of their neighbors. He
seems certain that he cannot win the case.47 Atticus admonish-
es his children that no matter how bitter things get, their neigh-
bors are still their friends and Maycomb is still their home.'
Shortly after his appointment, adults and other children
begin to criticize Atticus to Scout and Jem for their father's
44. LEE, supra note 1, at 174.
45. For a full, incisive discussion of the significant problems that arise in part
because of inexperienced capital defense counsel, see Ruth E. Friedman and Bryan
A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama's Capital Defense Problems: It's a Dollars and Sense
Thing, 44 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1992).
46. LEE, supra note 1, at 83.
47. LEE, supra note 1, at 96.
48. LEE, supra note 1, at 84.
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efforts to defend Tom.49 To defend a Black man against the
word of Whites was heresy. Even worse, "Atticus aim[ed] to
defend him." ' Scout and Jem have to endure slurs and taunts
from their neighbors who say Atticus lawed for nig-rs and tr-
sh.5' They also encounter a lynch mob prepared to supply its
own form of justice for Tom with a bullet or at the end of a rope.
Only the shame evoked by the presence of Scout and Jem dis-
suades the mob from its goal.52
Despite the threat on Tom's life, the trial begins without a
change of venue.' Although there is no medical evidence that a
rape occurred,' 4 several people testify about the alleged beating
and alleged rape. Heck Tate, the sheriff, testifies that Bob Ewell
summoned him to his house regarding the beating and rape of
his daughter.' The sheriff reports that when he arrived, he
found Mayella had been severely beaten; Mayella accuses Tom
not just of the beating, but also of rape." Tate also says that
Mayella had a bruised right eye and bruises completely around
her neck.57 The nature of her injuries suggested to even the
uninitiated that her attacker had use of both hands and led
mostly with his left hand. No doctor is called to confirm that a
rape or even sexual intercourse had occurred.' Instead, Sheriff
Tate accepts the story from Mayella and goes to Tom's house
and arrests him.59
Bob Ewell and Mayella Ewell perjure themselves when they
testify that Tom Robinson had beaten and raped her."M On
cross-examination, Atticus effectively challenges the credibility
of their testimony by implying that Bob Ewell had beaten,
Mayella after observing her holding Tom around the waist."'
49. LEE, supra note 1, at 82.
50. LEE, supra note 1, at 174.
51. LEE, supra note 1, at 112.
52. LEE, supra note 1, at 161-65.
53. LEE, supra note 1, at 169-77.
54. LEE, supra note 1, at 178.
55. LEE, supra note 1, at 177-80.
56. LEE, supra note 1, at 178.
57. LEE, supra note 1, at 179.
58. LEE, supra note 1, at 178-79.
59. LEE, supra note 1, at 177-80.
60. LEE, supra note 1, at 181-200.
61. LEE, supra note 1, at 186-89, 193-200.
1994] 415
Alabama Law Review
The linchpin of Atticus's cross-examination of Mayella is the
revelation to everyone in the courtroom that Tom had lost the
use of his left hand in a cotton gin accident as a child and that
Bob uses his left hand when writing his signature.62 Therefore,
it seems impossible for Tom to have caused Mayella's injuries.
Tom Robinson testifies that Mayella invited him into the
Ewell house under the ruse of needing help with a chore and
that once inside, she told him she had never kissed a man before
so she might as well kiss a nig-r.' Tom accuses Mayella of
tempting him, kissing him, and requesting that he do the same
to her.' Tom testifies that when he tried to leave, Mayella
blocked the door, and he did not dare try to move her for fear of
harming her.' It was about then that Tom saw Bob Ewell and
heard him exclaim "you god-mn whore, I'll kill ya."" Tom says
he fled because he was scared."
On cross-examination, Tom testifies that he had helped
Mayella with chores in the past because he felt sorry for her.'
This testimony proved too honest a response for the jury. For
them it was impermissible for a Black man to show sympathy or
speak of it regarding a White woman. Thus, Tom Robinson's
genuine sympathy and honesty were his undoing.69
The jury must decide if Tom violated Mayella or if Mayella
breached Maycomb's unwritten but strict code against interra-
cial liaisons. In his closing statement to the jury, Atticus sum-
marizes the testimony and questions the credibility of the
prosecution's witnesses." But he seems to understand that all
he has is the word of a Black man against the word of two
Whites. Atticus knows that the jury cannot possibly be expected
to take Tom Robinson's word against the Ewells', and he under-
stands that the "evil assumption[s] ... that all Negroes lie, that
all Negroes are basically immoral beings, [and] that all Negro
men are not to be trusted around [White] women," would impact
62. LEE, supra note 1, at 197-98.
63. LEE, supra note 1, at 206.
64. LEE, supra note 1, at 206.
65. LEE, supra note 1, at 206.
66. LEE, supra note 1, at 206.
67. LEE, supra note 1, at 210.
68. LEE, supra note 1, at 209, 216-17.
69. LEE, supra note 1, at 209.
70. LEE, supra note 1, at 214-18.
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the jury's deliberations.7' Here, Lee illustrates brilliantly how
racial animus and stereotypes influence credibility determina-
tions. Thus, if there is some consensus among Whites that Black
people frequently lie, it is not too surprising that an all-White
jury might disregard the sworn testimony of Black defense wit-
nesses. This concern is most acute in places where racial ste-
reotyping is prevalent, and in most of the United States and for
most of its history, racial stereotyping has been commonplace.72
In the end, Atticus has only one basis for a final appeal to the
jury. He turns to Thomas Jefferson and the equality principle.73
He asserts that
there is one way in this country in which all men are created
equal-there is one human institution that makes a pauper the
equal of a Rockefeller, the stupid man the equal of an Einstein,
and the ignorant man the equal of any college president .... Our
courts have their faults, as does any human institution, but in
this country our courts are the great levelers, and in our courts
all men are created equal.74
Unfortunately, real and fictional people have a way of carry-
ing their resentments right into the jury box.75 The most stir-
ring closing statements about equality do not make equal justice
a reality. If White folks can carry their resentments against
Black folks into the courtroom, then the presumption of inno-
cence within our criminal justice system is an empty idea.
Lee captures this contradiction poignantly. Atticus tells
71. LEE, supra note 1, at 216-17.
72. An important body of writing has emerged regarding the Black image in the
White mind. Black slavery in the United States was a declaration of war against
Blacks, whether slave or free. It was the ultimate assertion of White supremacy and
Black inferiority. Although slavery ended officially almost 13 decades ago, an ideolo-
gy of racial supremacy persists and for too many Whites there remains an emotional
antipathy to the idea of racial equality. Thus, even today in the minds of many,
interracial sex or marriage is taboo; Blacks are intellectually inferior and unprepared
to attend the same schools as Whites; and Blacks are docile, lazy, or depraved, ei-
ther because of their nature or because of their previous condition of servitude. See,
e.g., GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 3-5 (1971);
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACic AMERICAN ATrrITUDES TOwARD THE
NEGRO, 1550-1818 (1968). Both books assess the emergence of the ideology of White
supremacy and Black inferiority in the United States.
73. LEE, supra note 1, at 217.
74. LEE, supra note 1, at 218.
75. LEE, supra note 1, at 233.
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Scout well before the trial begins that he will not win.76 He also
tells his brother, Jack, that the jury cannot possibly be expected
to take Tom's word against the Ewells'." Thus, Atticus does not
appear surprised when Tom is convicted and sent to prison
pending an appeal. In "the secret courts of men's hearts,"78
Atticus had no case; Tom was a dead man the minute Mayella
Ewell pointed an accusing finger at him.
Atticus tries to reassure Tom that he has a good chance of
reversal on appeal. But Tom loses hope. One day during the
prison's exercise period, Tom attempts to escape and he is shot
seventeen times after a warning.79 With Tom's death, the mock-
ingbird-sin cycle is complete: Tom had been falsely accused,
wrongfully convicted, and killed.
The book concludes with Bob Ewell's attack on Jem and
Scout. Boo Radley comes to their rescue, but not before Jem's
arm has been broken and he is unconscious.' In this final
struggle, Boo either stabs Ewell or, as the sheriff believes, Ewell
falls on his own knife.
Interestingly, no trial follows Ewell's death. The sheriff
decides that it would be unthinkable to drag Boo into the lime-
light for doing his utmost to prevent a crime. That would be a
sin. Thus, the sheriff declares that Ewell accidentally fell on his
knife."' Unfortunately, no such discretion was exercised on be-
half of Tom Robinson. Although Atticus protests slightly, he
agrees to follow the story set forth by the sheriff.82
The contrast in the manner in which the sheriff handles the
alleged rape versus his manner in handling Ewell's death is
instructive. After his perfunctory investigation of each event, the
sheriff takes completely different actions. He arrests Tom Robin-
son based on the flimsiest circumstantial evidence; Tom has to
endure an all-White jury's evaluation of his innocence. However,
Tate exercises independent discretion to close the Ewell-Radley
encounter without the usual formality of an investigation or a
76. LEE, supra note 1, at 84.
77. LEE, supra note 1, at 96.
78. LEE, supra note 1, at 254.
79. LEE, supra note 1, at 248.
80. LEE, supra note 1, at 276-79.
81. LEE, supra note 1, at 290.
82. LEE, supra note 1, at 290-91.
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grand jury hearing. He does not even ask Boo what happened.
One can surmise that Tate's different conduct is more than
simply random. I think it can be explained in light of a
positivistic versus a natural law theory of criminal justice.'
Under the former, the sheriff, upon receiving the complaint by
the Ewells, must proceed to Tom Robinson's home and arrest
him. Even if the sheriff has doubts about the Ewells' claims, his
duty is to enforce the law. From there, the state treats Tom
Robinson as an accused, and the machinery of the criminal jus-
tice system is set in motion. So long as Robinson has the benefit
of some formal process, Tate and the other agents of the system
have done justice. However, under the natural law view, the
sheriff exercises near-complete discretion to decide that Bob
Ewell had accidently killed himself by falling on his knife. Jus-
tice means something different for Boo.. The sheriff says to
Atticus, "There's a Black boy dead for no reason, and the man
responsible for it's dead. Let the dead bury the dead this time,
Mr. Finch.""4
I wonder if the sheriff would have been so sympathetic if
Boo were Black. Said differently, it is unclear why Tom does not
evoke the' same kind of sympathy from the sheriff that Boo
evokes. Justice is served in Boo's case not through a public hear-
ing, but with an agreement that "it'd be sort of like shootin' a
mockingbird" to say anything other than that Ewell fell on his
knife." There is something grossly unsatisfying about the lack
of sympathy and institutional discretion available for defendants
such as Tom Robinson. Tom Robinson was expendable; he was
just a Black boy. Thus, even if Boo Radley was acting to protect
Scout and Jem, it seems an enormous challenge for people like
83. I am referring to the classic dilemma discussed rigorously by Robert Cover
in Justice Accused. ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 8-30 (1975). Cover describes
how eighteenth and nineteenth century jurists wrestled with their sense of duty and
role versus their sense of justice and higher law. Those jurists questioned slavery
but enforced the slave laws until they were abolished in 1865. In his introduction,
Cover quotes Melville's Billy Budd to portray the conflict patterns facing judges:
"For that law and the rigor of it, we are not responsible. Our vowed responsibility is
in this: That however pitilessly that law may operate in any instances, we neverthe-
less adhere to it and administer it." Id. at 3 (quoting HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY
BUDD 110-11 (Univ. of Chic. Press 1962) (1891)).
84. LEE, supra note 1, at 290.
85. LEE, supra note 1, at 291.
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Tate to see people like Tom Robinson as innocent mockingbirds.
Mockingbird, then, is a literary masterpiece that gives voice
to the obscure boundary between fictional and real accounts
relating to the illusion of racial equality within our criminal
justice system, and it poses significant contemporary questions
regarding the elusive quest to achieve for everyone the words
inscribed across the front of the United States Supreme Court
Building: EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW. Is equal justice a
charade? Can a presumption of innocence have any meaning for
a Black defendant like Tom Robinson in a criminal justice sys-
tem that has for so long permitted racial animus and double
standards against Blacks to infect proceedings? Can it mean
anything in a social structure which makes the humanity and
culture of Blacks invisible and by which Blacks become carica-
tures of the most prevalent racial stereotypes?
Too many Black criminal defendants are portrayed as de-
praved or beast-like brutes with insatiable appetites for White
women.' They are presumed guilty and have few resources at
their disposal to prove otherwise. And sometimes, even with the
best legal assistance, they are convicted because police or prose-
cutors withhold exculpatory or impeachment information. Put
simply, there is so much hate, mistrust, and scapegoating be-
tween Blacks and Whites that there are few, if any, effective
barriers to the influence of racial animus in the criminal justice
system. One result is numerous wrongful convictions, frequently
of poor, Black men who cannot afford to hire competent lawyers.
III. RACIAL ANIMUS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A Wrongful Convictions in the United States
Imagine you are dreaming:
You hear the news of a horrible crime that shocks and up-
sets your entire community. During a spring afternoon, a four-
year-old child disappears from a local shopping mall. The police
and concerned citizens (including yourself) conduct an extensive
86. FREDRICKSON, supra note 72, at 275-82.
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search for the child. Several hours later, searchers find the
child's mutilated body in dense underbrush a few minutes walk
from the shopping mall. An autopsy reveals that the child had
been sexually abused before he died of suffocation.
The local police go into action and round up over 100 possi-
ble suspects, including "every known pervert in town." Suspicion
then falls on you. An anonymous tip informed the police that
you had been seen at the mall on the fateful day, in the compa-
ny of a small child resembling the deceased. You eventually
confirm that you had been at the mall, and the police request
that you submit to a polygraph test. The test indicates that you
are not being deceptive and you are released.
The police continue to follow tips and to investigate your
background. They discover that you were sexually abused as a
child. They also hear a rumor that you had once sexually abused
your three-year-old nephew. The police ask you to submit to
other tests, including hypnosis.
You oblige the police without at any point consulting a law-
yer. You are released, only to be picked up. again two months
later and questioned for almost fifteen hours at police
headquarters. During this final interrogation, you say to the
police that you did not kill the child, but you will say you did if
they want you to. The police then encourage you to embellish
your "confession."
. The police declare that the murder has been solved and you
are arrested and charged with first degree murder. There is a
brief trial. The jury deliberates for seven hours and finds you
guilty of second degree murder because jurors did not think your
killing was premeditated. You are sentenced to life imprison-
ment. Pending your appeal, you are repeatedly sexually abused
by groups of inmates. The state supreme court denies your ap-
peal.
Three years pass before your community is again shocked by
the news of another child's abduction, which occurs very near
the location of the abduction for which you were convicted. A
day later the police find the naked body of the child. She had
been raped and murdered. This time the police find physical
evidence on a suspect that matches evidence at the crime scene.
The suspect has a thirty-year criminal history involving murder,
rape, sodomy, and assault.
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Before trial begins in the second case, an FBI officer who
had worked on your case meets with the suspect. The suspect
confesses to numerous crimes, including the one for which you
were convicted. The FBI agent then recalls a conversation with a
witness during the investigation of your case who had reported
seeing the child you allegedly murdered with an older man. The
agent looks across the table and realizes that he is sitting with a
person who fits the prior witness's description.
After over forty months, you are released from prison with
apologies. You try to re-enter your community and relationships,
but you cannot. You seek compensation for false imprisonment,
but your claim is dismissed. You wake up in a cold sweat. It
was just a nightmare.
Unfortunately, for Melvin Reynolds, the above scenario did
occur. He was wrongfully convicted of the 1978 murder of four-
year-old Eric Christgen. Luckily for Reynolds, but tragically for
eleven-year-old Michelle Steele, the real killer, Charles Hatcher,
struck again several years later and implicated himself in the
Christgen murder.17 Reynolds was then released.
Cases like Reynolds's occur more frequently than we might
think. In 1992, Michael L. Radelet, Hugo Adam Bedau, and
Constance E. Putnam collaborated to publish a seminal book
about wrongful convictions in capital cases during the twentieth
century. In Spite of Innocence' is the fruit of some thirty years
of intermittent research on wrongful convictions.
In Spite of Innocence begins by recounting the 1989 murder
in Boston of Carole Stuart, who at the time was pregnant with
her first child.' It was late October when Charles Stuart,
87. See TERRY GANEY, ST. JOSEPH'S CHILDREN: A TRUE STORY OF TERROR AND
JUSTICE (1989). Charles Hatcher ultimately confessed to the murder, but not before
he raped, sodomized, or murdered others throughout the Midwest. Id. at 233-37.
88. MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVIC-
TIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992). See also Innocence and the Death Penalty: Assessing
the Danger of Mistaken Executions, Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) [hereinafter Innocence and the Death Penalty] (staff report). Other hearings
were held before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 1, 1993. In 1993, four
condemned men from Maryland, Texas, Alabama, and Oklahoma had their convic-
tions reversed and were released from prison. See id. at 7-8.
89. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 3-5. All information on the Stuart murder
is taken from In Spite of Innocence.
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Carole's husband, telephoned the police and exclaimed, "My
wife's been shot. I've been shot!"° Carole had been shot at
point blank range in the face. Charles had been shot in the
stomach. Carole and the baby died. Reports of the crime were
headline news throughout the country. There was substantial
pressure on the local police to solve the crime.
Charles Stuart, recovering from his injuries, described the
gunman as six feet tall, Black, and about thirty years old (there
is no telling how many Black males fit Stuart's description). The
city's police commissioner reported to the media that Stuart's
description and fingerprint evidence from the vehicle were yield-
ing good leads. Police search efforts were concentrated around
the hospital outside of which the shooting had occurred, espe-
cially the public housing projects in the Mission Hill district,
home mainly to Blacks and minorities.
Two weeks after the Stuart murders, police arrested Willie
Bennett on a traffic offense. He had a previous criminal record,
was thirty-nine years old, and Black. Police showed a picture of
Bennett to Charles Stuart. They also arranged a line-up with
Bennett in it for Stuart to view. Stuart said Bennett looked most
like his wife's killer. The police had their guy, and the nation
turned to other stories.
One week into the new year, the case suddenly turned even
more bizarre. Charles Stuart jumped to his death from a local
bridge just after police were informed that Stuart -had killed his
pregnant wife. The motive for the murder was apparently insur-
ance. Bennett's ordeal ended before any trial. But it seemed
routine for the police to attribute the murder to Bennett without
any corroborative evidence and only a weak, tainted line-up
identification.
The Willie Bennett case is at one end of the continuum of
wrongful conviction cases. Although the police were prepared to
attribute the crime to Bennett and had made it easier for
Charles Stuart to identify Bennett as the murderer, Stuart's
brother-in-law implicated Charles. However, it would hardly be
fair to say Bennett was not a victim or that the criminal justice
system worked. Charles Stuarfs second crime was to accuse an
innocent person of a murder that he had planned and commit-
90. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 3.
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ted. And the police not only believed him, seemingly without
reservation, but also aided him in implicating an innocent Black
defendant.
At the other end of the continuum are cases like that of
James Adams.9' Adams was executed in the Florida electric
chair in May, 1984, for the 1973 murder of Edgar Brown. Brown
was found badly beaten, apparently during the course of a rob-
bery. The killer had entered Brown's home and beaten him with
a fireplace poker. Brown died the next day.
Adams's car had been parked in Brown's driveway and had
been seen going to and from the house. One witness identified
Adams as the driver of the car; another said that he thought
Adams was the driver. A third witness, who had driven up to
the house shortly after Brown had returned home on the morn-
ing of the murder, testified that he heard a woman shout from
inside, "In the name of God, don't do it!"' The witness then
saw and spoke briefly with someone leaving the house, but did
not identify Adams as the person he saw. The witness also said
that the person he saw was darker than Adams and, unlike
Adams, had no mustache. When this witness reviewed a police
line-up that included Adams he said he was positive that none
of the men was the person he had seen leaving the house.
Adams had several prior convictions and had escaped from
prison ten months before Brown's murder. He claimed that on
the morning of the murder, he had loaned his car to Vivian
Nickerson and Kenneth Crowell. Adams said that while they
used his car, he remained at the Nickerson's house playing
cards.
Vivian Nickerson was only fifteen years old. However, she
was very large for her age and had a strikingly masculine ap-
pearance. Moreover, she resembled Adams and fit the witness
description of the person seen leaving Brown's house better than
did Adams. Plus, her voice may have been the one heard by the
witness. The police did not show the witness any photos of
Nickerson. Nickerson was called as an alibi witness, but she
gave testimony at trial that conflicted with what she had said in
91. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 5-10. All information on the Adams
conviction is taken from In Spite of Innocence.
92. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 8.
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a deposition. However, Adams's counsel did not confront her
with the contradiction.
One final blow to Adams's defense was that the State did
not disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. Apparently,
Mrs. Brown had found strands of hair clasped in her husband's
hand while on the way to the hospital. State forensic experts
had compared that hair with samples from Adams and conclud-
ed Adams was definitely not the source. The jury did not have
all the information available to the State, and Adams's counsel
was ineffective at critical junctures. The jury never had access to
some evidence that raised substantial doubts about Adams's
guilt. Therefore, due process was thwarted.
Was an innocent person executed? We will probably never
know because once a defendant is executed there is no forum to
evaluate guilt or innocence. There is rarely any effort expended
on vindicating the deceased. Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam be-
lieve that in at least two dozen cases this century, the evidence
similarly suggests that the wrong defendant was executed. 3
In Spite of Innocence provides a gripping summary of hun-
dreds of cases similar to the Adams case from across the country
in which persons were convicted of heinous crimes that they did
not in fact commit and for which most were ultimately exoner-
93. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 9-10. No government authority has ever
acknowledged that an innocent person has been executed by order of the govern-
ment. A previous version of the Bedau-Radelet study (Hugo A. Bedau and Michael
L. Radelet, Miscarriage of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21
(1987)) has been critiqued by some commentators. See Stephen J. Markman & Paul
G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 121 (1988). Markman and Cassell maintain there is no intolerable risk of
executing innocent persons and that the benefits of capital punishment outweigh the
costs. Id. at 121-22 n.3.
Bedau and Radelet responded to this critique in Hugo A. Bedau and Michael
L. Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 161 (1988). The reply suggests that former Attorney General Edwin Meese, III
requested Markman to draft a response to the Bedau-Radelet study. See id. at 161
n.1.
Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam also acknowledge the pioneering work of others
who have researched the prevalence and causes of wrongful convictions. They ref-
erence the work of Jerome and Barbara Frank, Edwin Borchard, Erle Stanley Gar-
ner, James McCloskey, and Centurion Ministries, and the case studies of wrongful
convictions by Mark Lane, Willard J. Lassers, Nick Davies, and Randall Adams,
among others. In Search of Innocence contains an extensive bibliography and list of




ated. The book is compelling because the authors show a special
sensitivity to the many victims of such cases, those wrongly
accused and their families, and those injured and their families.
The 416 case files discussed in the book date from 1900 to 1991
and, in each case, there is some evidence that the wrongful con-
victions could have been avoided.
The authors do not include cases of wrongful accusation,
arrest, indictment, and trial in their estimate of the number of
wrongful convictions.' Thus, there is no telling how many cas-
es like Willie Bennett's have occurred. The authors also exclude
from the book cases in which there is no dispute about whether
the defendant committed the killing. For example, if one is con-
victed of murder and subsequent evidence suggests self-defense,
the authors would not include such a case in the book.95 They
have included cases that they believe represent miscarriages of
justice: those where no crime occurred (person consented to sex
or person is not murdered)' and those where a crime occurred,
but authorities convict the wrong person.97
In about ninety percent of the cases profiled in In Spite of
Innocence, there is official evidence of governmental error.98
This evidence of error includes appellate reversals of convictions,
acquittals on retrials, and prosecutorial decisions not to retry
cases. In many cases, there was also unofficial evidence suggest-
ing innocence, including evidence of police or attorney miscon-
duct or perjury, that was unavailable or undisclosed at the time
of trial, but the defendant was unable to convince a court or the
governor that this evidence proved his innocence."
The authors provide an insightful inventory of the factors
that lead to wrongful convictions. The two biggest culprits are
perjury by prosecution witnesses and mistaken eyewitness testi-
mony."° Even Black professionals like Lenell Geter, a twenty-
94. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 16.
95. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 17.
96. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 17.
97. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 17.
98. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 17.
99. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 17-18.
100. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 18. The first three chapters discuss cases
in which one or both factors were involved. Included is the story of Randall Dale
Adams from Texas where perjured testimony from the actual murderer, David Ray
Harris, led to Adams's wrongful conviction. Adams was in prison for over 12 years
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four-year-old engineer, have been wrongfully convicted based on
mistaken identification (all Blacks look alike) or police miscon-
duct.1"' Other significant factors include negligent or incompe-
tent police investigation, confessions obtained through police
brutality or duress, prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory
evidence, police tampering with evidence, suggestive line-ups,
and ineffective assistance of counsel.' 2 The likelihood of error
increases substantially when local passions and prejudices are
aroused against vulnerable defendants such as occurred in the
wrongful conviction of Clarence Brandley.'3
The Brandley case illustrates the interplay between the
myriad circumstances that lead to wrongful convictions and ra-
cial animus. Brandley was convicted of the rape and murder of
sixteen-year-old Cheryl Dee Fergeson in Conroe, Texas. The
murder occurred on a Saturday morning just before Ferguson's
team was to play a volleyball game. She had been last seen
going toward the girls' restroom. When she failed to return to
the warm-up session, the coach sent other girls to find her, to no
avail.
After completing the volleyball game, the team began anew
the search for Cheryl. After about two hours, two janitors dis-
covered her dead in the school's auditorium. She was nude ex-
cept for her socks. Her other clothes were missing. An autopsy
revealed Cheryl had been forcibly held, strangled, and raped,
possibly after she had lost consciousness or after she had died.
Suspicion first fell on the janitors who found the body, Hen-
ry Peace and Clarence Brandley. One of the first police officers
to interview Peace and Brandley, according to Peace, said, "One
of the two of you is going to hang for this."' 4 And then the offi-
cer turned to Brandley and added, "Since you're the nig-r,
before his release in 1989. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 72. For a full dis-
cussion of the Adams case, see RANDALL D. ADAMS ET AL., ADAMS V. TEXAS (1991).
101. For a summary of the Geter story, see MARTIN YANT, PRESUMED GUILTY 15-
19 (1991). Fortunately for Geter, his irate, mostly White coworkers refused to believe
he was guilty and they raised the money for his defense and ultimate vindication.
RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 17-18.
102. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 18-19.
103. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 119-36. See NICK DAVIES, WHITE LIES:
RAPE, MURDER, AND JUSTICE TEXAS STYLE (1991). All information on the Brandley
case is taken from In Spite of Innocence.
104. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 121.
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you're elected."' A criminal justice system that acquiesces in
this kind of racial animus is not worthy of respect. Brandley's
conviction should have been presumptively invalid upon proof of
the officer's statement. The statement reflects the environment
that produced Brandley's conviction.
Investigators questioned both men and took fingerprints as
well as hair and blood samples. Both were subjected to
polygraph tests, which they passed. Yet, it was late summer and
Conroe was in an uproar over the crime. The police needed to
make an arrest. One week after the crime, Brandley was arrest-
ed and charged with capital murder. There were five janitors on
duty the morning that Fergeson was killed."° Brandley, the
supervisor, was the only Black janitor.
From the start, Brandley insisted he was innocent. But
when police found Fergeson's clothes two days after her murder
in a plastic bag in a dumpster behind the school, they found
strings on her jeans similar to those from a janitor's mop. The
prosecution would also allege that police had found hair samples
similar to Brandley's (although the samples were never tested).
Three of the four other janitors provided alibis for each
other. The fourth, Peace, who actually found the body, reported
that Brandley suggested several times that he should look "real
good" around the auditorium.0 7 Such circumstantial evidence
was enough to arrest Brandley.
Brandley appeared before an all-White grand jury. He could
not produce any witness to account for his whereabouts when
Fergeson disappeared, but he said he was in his office smoking a
cigarette and listening to the radio. He was indicted.
At his first trial, he again faced an all-White jury.
Brandley's testimony directly contradicted the testimony of sev-
eral Whites. The trial ended with a hung jury. The juror who
refused to vote for guilt later reported that he had been called a
nig-r-lover during jury deliberations. After the trial, that juror
continued to experience harassment.
In the second trial, Brandley did not testify. Neither did one
105. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 121.
106. In addition to Peace and Brandley, Gary Acreman, John Sessum, and Sam
Martinez were also questioned. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 121.
107. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 123.
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of the White janitors, John Sessum. The others testified that
only Brandley had keys to the auditorium and supported each
other's alibis. New evidence in the second trial suggested that
Brandley had an uncontrolled sexual appetite. Also, medical
experts testified that Brandley's belt was consistent with what-
ever was used to strangle Fergeson. Finally, Brandley had a
part-time job at a funeral home. The prosecution portrayed him
as a necrophiliac. Brandley was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death.
While Brandley's lawyers prepared his appeal, they discov-
ered that over one-half of the 309 exhibits used at trial had van-
ished. For example, photos taken of Brandley on the day of the
murder, which the defense alleged would have shown he was not
wearing a belt, had disappeared. Also, the hair samples that
supposedly were similar to Brandley's had disappeared. Even
before the first trial, the spermatozoa taken from Fergeson had
been discarded by the county medical examiner. Was it sloppy
police work or purposely destroyed evidence?
Four years after his conviction, Brandley's appeal was de-
nied. Brandley was given his first death date: January 16, 1986.
That date was canceled after Brandley's lawyers filed a writ of
habeas corpus and it was granted.
Just before the habeas hearing, Brandley got his first real
break. Brenda Medina from a nearby town came forward with
evidence that her former common-law husband, James Dexter
Robinson, had confessed to the murder, but at the time she had
thought he was just. bragging. Medina said she did not learn
about the case until early 1986 when a neighbor mentioned it.
When Medina went to the prosecutor, she was not believed.
Therefore, the prosecutor did not inform the defense about her
statement. Fortunately, the lawyer with whom Medina first
spoke called the defense lawyers directly. After Medina passed a
polygraph test, the defense team took her sworn statement.
John Sessum,-who had failed to testify at the second trial,
used the habeas proceeding to recant his testimony. This time
he said he had seen another of the janitors, Gary Acreman,
talking with the victim shortly before the murder and that
Acreman had threatened him with trouble if he mentioned any-
thing about it. He also told the court he had been threatened




Acreman's father-in-law, Edward Payne, testified that on
the night of the murder, Acreman had told him where the
victim's clothes were hidden. Payne testified that when he tried
to report this information to the district attorney, he was told
the office was not interested.
Medina testified that James Robinson had confessed to the
murder and told her he had to leave town for a while. By the
next morning he had in fact left, leaving a pair of blood-stained
sneakers. One month before Cheryl's murder, Robinson had been
fired from Conroe High School where he had worked as a jani-
tor. Acreman, who had not previously said anything about
Robinson's presence at the school on the morning of the murder,
then admitted to having seen him briefly that morning. In the
face of all this new evidence, Brandley's motion for a new trial
was denied and the appellate court affirmed. A new execution
date was set.
The case had attracted national attention and in February,
1987, 1000 protestors marched in Conroe on Brandley's behalf.
Shortly thereafter, James McCloskey of Centurion Ministries
became involved with the Brandley case."° McCloskey and the
defense team's investigator, Richard Reyna, traveled the state
for several weeks talking with witnesses.
Perhaps it was McCloskey's clerical collar, but he and Reyna
persuaded Sessum to allow them to videotape his statement.
Sessum now said he had seen Acreman and Robinson with the
victim and had heard her cries of "No" and "Don't" coming from
inside the bathroom."°
Acreman, when confronted with the statements from
Sessum, also agreed to make a statement on videotape. He made
several inconsistent tapes, but ultimately accused Robinson and
alleged that he had seen Robinson put the victim's clothes in the
dumpster. On March 20, 1987, six days before his scheduled
execution, Brandley was granted another stay.
At yet another hearing, substantial evidence emerged to
suggest that Texas Ranger Styles and others had not tried to
108. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 129.
109. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 130.
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find the murderer but instead had tried to convict Brandley."n
The new judge concluded that Brandley deserved a new trial
and that it was very likely Robinson and Acreman had killed
Fergeson.
It was a full year before the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals awarded Brandley a new trial. Brandley was finally re-
leased, but not because the criminal justice system worked. In
fact, it seemed more geared towards Brandley's execution than
towards a determination of an error regarding his conviction.
Alarmingly, almost all of the wrongful convictions reported
in modern studies were corrected through the efforts of persons
outside the criminal justice system: journalists, private detec-
tives, relatives of the prisoner, or organizations dedicated to
freeing wrongly convicted persons"'
One cannot come away from reading In Spite of Innocence
and other wrongful conviction studies without substantial con-
cern for the "ineptness, crudity, and unfairness" of the American
criminal justice system."2 The public has an enormous toler-
ance for the types of misconduct illustrated by the conviction of
Clarence Brandley. There is a pernicious belief that in cases like
Brandley's, the defendants must be guilty of something and
therefore it is acceptable if agents of the criminal justice system
use illegal tactics against them. That attitude licenses not only
misconduct against innocent persons, it creates a culture in
which all criminal defendants and their representatives are sub-
ject to unwarranted abuse.
B. The Supreme Court's Assessment of Racial
Bias in the Criminal Justice System
An important parallel to the significant number of wrongful
convictions in the United States has been the Supreme Court's
110. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 132-33.
111. See RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 132-33, 208-11, for a description of
the role of Mark Lane in the reversal of James Richardson's wrongful conviction; see
also MARK LANE, ARCADIA (1970) (same); RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 68-70
(describing film producer Errol Morris's role in the reversal of Randall Adams's
conviction).
112. WILLARD LASSERS, SCAPEGOAT JUSTICE: LLOYD MILLER AND THE FAILURE OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (1973).
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erratic concern for racial bias in the criminal justice system. As
early as 1880, the Court held it was unconstitutional to exclude
Blacks from a jury venire."' The Court wrote that the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment meant
the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the
white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand
equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored
race... that no discrimination shall be made against them by
law because of their color.
114
The Court concluded that where a statute denies Blacks all
rights to participate in the administration of the law as jurors, it
"is practically a brand upon them,... an assertion of their infe-
riority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an im-
pediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice
which the law aims to secure to all others.""'
The Court has demonstrated a greater tolerance for racial
discrimination than the above-quoted text suggests. The Court
did not proscribe all forms of discrimination. The Court wrote
that a state may confine the selection of jurors to males, free-
holders, citizens, certain age groups, or persons having certain
educational qualifications."6 Thus, in addition to authorizing
facial discrimination against women, the opinion gave States
broad discretion to use property and education qualifications as
113. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Under West Virginia law, a
Black was not eligible to be a member of a grand or petit jury. The statute was
challenged under the recently enacted Fourteenth Amendment. The Court made clear
in its opinion that the question for decision was not whether a Black had a right to
a grand or petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race or
color. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304. Instead, the question was whether, in the composi-
tion or selection of jurors by whom one is to be indicted or tried, all persons of
one's race or color may be excluded solely on the basis of race. Id.
114. Id. at 307. The Court continued:
The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a
necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the
colored race,--the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them
distinctively as colored,-exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferi-
ority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights
which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing
them to the condition of a subject race.
Id. at 307-08.
115. Id. at 308.
116. Id. at 309.
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bases to continue discriminatory policies against Blacks. States
took the hint by adopting procedures that kept juries mostly, if
not completely, White. For example, some States adopted a sys-
tem of jury commissioners who had the authority to identify
males over twenty-one years of age who were reputed to be hon-
est, intelligent men of good character for jury service.""
Eight and one-half decades later, the Court reaffirmed the
principal doctrine of Strauder. In Swain v. Alabama,"' a Black
man was convicted of the rape of a seventeen-year-old White
woman and sentenced to death by an all-White jury in
Talladega, Alabama."' Under Alabama law, three jury com-
missioners were required to place on the jury roll all male cit-
izens over age twenty-one who were reputed to be honest, intelli-
gent men, esteemed for their integrity, good character, and
sound judgment.20 Under such procedures, a disproportionate
number of Whites were placed on jury rolls.
The Court said, "[W]henever by any action of a State... all
persons of the African race are excluded, solely because of their
race or color, from serving as grand jurors in the criminal prose-
cution of a person of the African race, the equal protection of the
laws is denied.... .121 The Court also wrote that such racial
discrimination "is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic
society and a representative government.""2 Finally, and per-
haps most significantly, the Court said that "purposeful discrim-
ination may not be assumed or merely asserted. It must be prov-
en, the quantum of proof necessary being a matter of federal
law."
123
The Court distinguished Swain from Strauder because in
Swain there was insufficient evidence that all Blacks were ex-
cluded from the jury venire. In Swain, the evidence showed that
while Black males over twenty-one constituted twenty-six per-
cent of all males in the county, only ten to fifteen percent of the
117. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
118. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
119. Swain, 380 U.S. at 203.
120. Id. at 206.
121. Id. at 204 (citing Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900)).
122. Id. at 204 (citing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S 128, 130 (1940)).
123. Id. at 205 (citation omitted).
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grand or petit jury panels drawn from the jury box since 1953
had been Black." The Court found that the disparity between
the number of Blacks in the population and the number actually
serving on a jury was too small to establish a prima facie case of
invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.1w
The Court reiterated that "[n]either the jury roll nor the venire
need be a perfect mirror of the community or accurately reflect
the proportionate strength of every identifiable group."' G
Therefore, Swain is significant because it imposed on the plain-
tiff the burden of proving that the jury selection process was
intentionally discriminatory and not just imperfect.'27
A related development occurred in 1972, when the Court
invalidated all state death-sentencing statutes then in effect on
the grounds that juries imposed death sentences without suffi-
cient guidelines, standards, and appellate oversight." At least
124. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205. The Court said that since 1953, Blacks had served
on approximately 80% of the grand juries, the number ranging from one to three.
Id. The Court did not find it necessary to explain why it satisfied the Constitution
to have so few Blacks in the jury pool and even fewer actually serve on juries.
125. Id. at 206.
126. Id. at 208.
127. Id. at 209. The petitioner in Swain also argued that the prosecutor in
Talladega County had exercised his peremptory challenges (the process of removing
persons from the venire without explanation or justification) to exclude Blacks from
serving on petit juries. Id. The Court held that "[t]he presumption in any particular
case must be that the prosecutor is using the state's challenges to obtain a fair or
impartial jury .. . . The presumption is not overcome . . . by allegations that . . .
all Negroes were removed from the jury . . . because they were Negroes." Id. at 222.
The Court suggested that to establish a case of prosecutorial misconduct would
require proof that the prosecutor systematically exercised peremptory challenges in a
series of cases to exclude all Blacks. Id. at 223-24.
In 1977, the Court revisited issues similar to those presented in Swain. In
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), there was a greater statistical disparity
between the general population of persons with Spanish surnames and such persons
who were called to serve on grand or petit juries than had been the case in Swain.
Partida proffered evidence that over an 11-year period, while 79% of the persons in
the county population had Spanish surnames, only 39% of the persons summoned for
grand jury service had Spanish surnames. Id. at 494-95. The Court said that such a
disparity was sufficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimination and shifted
the burden of proof to the state to dispel the inference of discrimination. Id. at 496.
128. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The five Justices in the majority
each wrote separate concurrences, providing different theories for their view that the
death-sentencing procedures were unconstitutional (Douglas, Brennan, Marshall,
Stewart, and White, JJ., concurring). Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall
believed that then-operating statutes permitted juries to discriminate on the basis of
race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 249-50, 255-57 (Douglas, J.,
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three members of the Court believed that death-sentencing pro-
cedures permitted juries to discriminate against criminal defen-
dants on the basis of race, in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Pending the Furman
decision, no state could execute aperson sentenced to death."o
The legislative response to Furman was swift. Many states
enacted statutes that limited the category of murders in which
death sentences could be imposed and codified specific aggravat-
ing factors, at least one of which had to be present before a
death sentence could be imposed.' Most states also bifurcated
the guilt and sentencing phases of capital trials."2 Finally,
most jurisdictions adopted enhanced appellate oversight policies,
requiring state appellate judges to review death sentences to as-
sess whether those sentences were based upon similar facts."
The Court found these types of modifications in death sentenc-
ing procedures sufficient to eliminate the constitutional prob-
lems identified in Furman."3
In Gregg v. Georgia and its companion cases, the Court
rejected the view that the death penalty was an inherently ex-
concurring); id. at 293-95 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 364-66, 368 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
For a comprehensive analysis of pre-Furman and post-Furman death sentenc-
ing procedures, see generally DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY 7-39 (1990) (evaluating whether states have eliminated the arbitrari-
ness and discrimination that prompted a majority of the Court to invalidate death-
sentencing statutes in Furman and concluding that while there has been a decline
in arbitrariness and discrimination, death sentences are still imposed against defen-
dants whose cases are not among the most aggravated, and the challenge then is
whether death sentencing can be limited to the worst offenders).
129. See Furman, 409 U.S. at 249-50, 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 293-
95 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 364-66, 368 (Marshall, J., concurring).
130. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 128, at 9-10.
131. Aggravating circumstances might include, for example, killing a police officer
or a vile or atrocious murder. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 128, at 22-23.
132. Under such procedures, the jury initially hears evidence solely as to guilt of
the defendant. If the jury convicts, the case proceeds (sometimes immediately) with
evidence to determine the appropriate sentence. BALDUS ST AL., supra note 128, at
23.
133. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 128, at 33-34.
134. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Unfortunately, wrongful convictions have
continued despite these reforms. Since 1973, 48 persons have been released from
prison (43 from death row) after new evidence of innocence was located. See Inno-
cence and the Death Penalty, supra note 88, at 2-8.
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cessive sentence for aggravated murder." It also ruled that
the Georgia procedure that permits juries to impose a life sen-
tence, no matter what aggravating circumstances existed in a
particular case, does not violate the Constitution." Thus,
within a four-year period, the Court suggested that the myriad
problems with most states' death sentencing procedures had
been eliminated.
The erratic concern reflected by the Court in Strauder and
Furman and their progeny converged in the Court's 1987 de-
cision in McCleskey v. Kemp. 7 Warren McCleskey, a Black
man, was convicted of killing a White police officer during the
course of a robbery." Pursuant to Georgia law, the jury found
two aggravating circumstances upon which to base McCleskey's
death sentence: killing a peace officer engaged in his duties and
commission of a murder during a planned robbery."9 The jury
recommended that McCleskey be sentenced to death, and the
trial court agreed. 4 The Supreme Court of Georgia af-
firmed.'
Ultimately, McCleskey filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, claiming that the Georgia death-sentencing
process was administered in a racially discriminatory man-
ner.42 In support of his claims, McCleskey proffered a statisti-
cal study by Professor David Baldus" indicating that defen-
135. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187.
136. Id. at 203. Members of the plurality and concurring opinions seemed influ-
enced by the Georgia Supreme Court's statutory duty to review each death sentence.
Id. at 203, 222-24 (White, J., concurring).
137. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
138. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 282.
139. Id. at 284-85.
140. Id. at 285.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 286. Specifically, McCleskey argued that Georgia's administration of
the death penalty violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
143. Professors David Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth performed
the study and published their findings in a comprehensive book. BALDUS ET AL.,
supra note 128, at 80-139, 198-228, 306-425. The book presents the results of two
overlapping empirical studies of post-Furman legislative reforms regarding whether
new standards and guidelines to channel the exercise of jury discretion were ef-
fective and whether comparative proportionality review by state appellate courts
assured that death sentencing systems were operating in a consistent, nondiscrimina-
tory fashion. The authors found that although the levels of arbitrariness and racial
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dants charged with killing Whites were 4.3 times as likely to
receive a death sentence in Georgia as defendants charged with
killing Blacks, and that Black defendants were 1.1 times as
likely to receive a death sentence as other defendants.'" The
lower federal courts rejected McCleskey's petition.145  The
United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and af-
firmed the lower courts by a vote of five to four.'"
As to McCleskey's Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the
Court wrote that a defendant who alleges an equal protection
violation has the burden of proving the existence of purposeful
discrimination and that the purposeful discrimination had a
discriminatory effect in his case. 4 7 The Court found that
McCleskey offered no evidence specific to his own case that
would support an inference that racial considerations played a
part in his sentence. Instead, he relied on the Baldus study.
The Court distinguished prior decisions in which it had
accepted statistical studies as proof of discrimination in the con-
text of jury selection and Title VII decisions." The Court rea-
soned that in capital sentencing cases, each jury or prosecutor is
unique and each decision rests on innumerable factors that vary
according to each individual defendant and the facts of each
offense. 49 Therefore, it would be inappropriate to infer a policy
of discrimination by combining the decisions of different juries or
prosecutors."W The Court concluded that "[b]ecause discretion
is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand ex-
ceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion
has been abused." 5' To prove discriminatory purpose, the
Court wrote that McCleskey would have to demonstrate that
discrimination in capital sentencing.had declined since 1972, there was still evidence
of a racial disparity in the application of the death penalty and of arbitrary, ex-
cessive sentences. BALDuS ET AL., supra note 128, at 394-425. For a summary of
other statewide studies, see BALDUS ET AL., supra note 128, at 229-65.
144. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 128, at 400-08.
145. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 288-91.
146. Id. at 291. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia.
147. Id. at 292.
148. Id. at 293-96.
149. Id. at 294-95 & nn.15-18.
150. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 294-95 & nn.15-18.
151. Id. at 297.
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agents of the state had followed a course of action in his case
"'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group."'52
The Court also rejected McCleskey's Eighth Amendment
claim. It reasoned that because his sentence was imposed under
Georgia sentencing procedures that focus discretion on the objec-
tive circumstances of the crime, the sentence did not offend the
Constitution and was not disproportionate within any recognized
meaning of the Eighth Amendment.'" Moreover, the Court
concluded that the Baldus study did not demonstrate a constitu-
tionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capi-
tal-sentencing process.'" The Court viewed McCleskey's
Eighth Amendment legal theory as a challenge to the entire
criminal justice system and said there was no limiting principle
to his challenge. 55 The Court hinted that its acceptance of
McCleskey's claim would open the criminal justice system to
challenges from other claimants.'" Finally, the Court suggest-
ed that it was beyond its province to determine the appropriate
punishment for particular crimes and thus, McCleskey's claims
and statistical studies should have been presented to legislative
bodies.'57
The four dissenting Justices accepted the Baldus study's
validity and concluded that it proved the Georgia death-sentenc-
ing process created an intolerable risk that McCleskey's sen-
tence was influenced by impermissible racial considerations.'"
Justice Brennan recalled how Georgia and other States had
operated dual systems of criminal justice as far back as the
colonial period, which differentiated between crimes by and
against Whites and Blacks, and noted that the Georgia Penal
Code had contained separate sections for slaves and free persons
152. Id. at 298. Here the Court applied the difficult-to-prove standard set out in
cases following Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Personnel Adm'r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
153. Id. at 307-08 & n.28.
154. Id. at 313.
155. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314-18.
156. Id. at 315-17.
157. Id. at 319.
158. Id. at 325-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens joined in Justice Brennan's dissent).
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of color and all other persons.159 For example, rape of a free
White female by a Black was punishable by death; however,
rape by anyone else of a White female was punishable by a pris-
on term of two to twenty years." The rape of Blacks was pun-
ishable by fine or imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.16' Justice Brennan concluded that Georgia's history of
racially biased criminal justice and its continuing legacy, reflect-
ed in Furman and its progeny, buttressed the probative value of
the Baldus study and McCleskey's constitutional claims."2
After McCleskey, it seems clear that an empirically signifi-
cant risk of racial discrimination against a criminal defendant is
not sufficient to prove purposeful discrimination. Justice
Brennan says best why McCleskey is so troubling.
Considering the race of a defendant or victim in deciding if
the death penalty should be imposed is completely at odds with
this concern that an individual be evaluated as a unique human
being. Decisions influenced by race rest in part on a categorical
assessment of the worth of human beings according to color, in-
sensitive to whatever qualities the individuals in question may
possess. Enhanced willingness to impose the death sentence on
black defendants, or diminished willingness to render such a
sentence when blacks are victims, reflects a devaluation of the
lives of black persons. When confronted with evidence that race
more likely than not plays such a role in a capital-sentencing sys-
tem, it is plainly insufficient to say that the importance of discre-
tion demands that the risk be higher before we will act-for in
such a case the very end that discretion is designed to serve is
being undermined."
No one should be indicted, prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced to
die because of his race or the race of his victim.
The split within the Court regarding the role of discretion
and the influence of racial bias in the criminal justice system
159. Id. at 329-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 329-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing GA. PENAL
CODE, pt. 4, tit. 1, div. 4 §§ 4704, 4249 (1861)).
161. Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting); GA. PENAL CODE, pt. 4, tit. 1, div. 4 §
4249 (1861). See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE IN THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PRocEss 24-25 (1978); Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67
TUL. L. REV. 2063, 2064-66 (1993).
162. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 334-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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goes to the core of the issues raised in wrongful conviction capi-
tal murder cases. McCleskey appears to create an irrebuttable
presumption that agents of the criminal justice system exercise
their discretion constitutionally." Such a presumption is inde-
fensible given our history of pernicious racial prejudice and the
substantial evidence of its use against Blacks in the criminal
justice system. I think that in capital cases in which the races of
the defendant and of the victim are different, the presumption
should be that agents of the court are unable to control or ignore
their racial bias. Empirical data demonstrating a significant
racial disparity in the application of a state's death-sentencing
procedures should shift to the prosecution the burden to rebut
the empirical data. If the state cannot rebut the empirical data,
the court should assume that there was an intolerable risk that
racial bias influenced the conviction. Such an evidentiary stan-
dard would give the state greater incentive to eradicate racial
discrimination from the criminal justice system.
In light of McCleskey and the myriad case studies on wrong-
ful convictions, one cannot help but wonder if the constitutional
guarantees afforded by the Bill of Rights to all criminal defen-
dants have been suspended for some. The precious freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizure, the requirement of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant, the privilege against self-
incrimination, the prohibition against double jeopardy, the broad
protections of the Due Process Clause, the guarantee of a
speedy, public trial, the right to confront witnesses, the prohibi-
tion against excessive bail, fines, and cruel and unusual punish-
ments, and the right to effective assistance of counsel all suppos-
edly operate to protect us from miscarriages of justice. Yet, these
guarantees remain empty words for many accused persons. Says
Willard Lassers, "American justice is capable of extraordinary
refinement and discernment but it is capable also of gross,
shocking and scandalous abuses.""8 The Walter McMillian
case is a recent example of unequal justice, and it is a reminder
that the boundary between fictional Maycomb and contemporary
towns throughout the United States is often opaque.
164. See id. at 337 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165. LASSERS, supra note 112, at 2.
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IV. THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION
OF WALTER MCMILLIAN
In June, 1987, Walter McMillian, a forty-five-year-old pulp-
wood worker, was charged with the robbery and murder of
Ronda Morrison, an eighteen-year-old part-time employee at
Jackson Cleaners in the small rural South Alabama town of
Monroeville. McMillian is Black and Morrison was White. Morri-
son had been shot in the back three times, once at close range,
apparently as she tried to flee her still unknown assailant(s).
The nation learned of McMillian when a story on his case ap-
peared on CBS-TV's program 60 Minutes on November 22, 1992.
McMillian remained on death row from July, 1987, thirteen
months before his trial, until his release from prison in March,
1993, when his conviction was reversed and the state declined to
retry him." There is probably no way to assess the psychologi-
cal toll that McMillian has endured. What restitution does the
state owe him? Who is responsible for his wrongful conviction?
Does he have viable claims against the law enforcement person-
nel or former prosecutors who fabricated the case against him?
And what about the additional injury to the Morrisons?
Morrison's murder was a horrible tragedy. It has been devastat-
ing for those who live and work in or near Monroeville, espe-
cially her parents, who lost their only child to a violent, prema-
ture death. It was a senseless and heinous murder that showed
a callous disregard for a precious young life. Yet, our outrage
and disdain for the unknown person(s) who killed Morrison
should never excuse the wrongful conviction of an innocent per-
son.
Today Morrison's murder is again an unsolved homicide.
Morrison's family and friends must again suffer the uncertainty
of not knowing who killed her or why. And her killer may yet
walk among us.
There are many compelling reasons to tell this story. The
most significant reason is that Ronda Morrison should not have
died in vain. Her family should know all that the police and
166. See infra notes 252-341 and accompanying text.
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prosecutors knew when they wrongfully tried and convicted
Walter McMillian. The public should know that there is no rea-
son to place total trust in the criminal justice system or its
agents because they are fallible and sometimes they knowingly
lie to us, suppress evidence, and otherwise violate their duty to
uphold the law. Finally, the McMillian case demonstrates how
difficult it was for him to move a court to take seriously his
claims and proof of his innocence. Whatever one's views regard-
ing capital punishment, if we proceed too swiftly to execute
persons convicted of capital murder, we will undoubtedly execute
some whose only "crime" is to be Black, poor, or both.
The law enforcement agencies and prosecutors involved in
the Morrison-McMillian case did a tremendous disservice to the
people of Monroeville, especially the Morrisons and the
McMillians. They also have wrought tremendous burdens on
Walter McMillian and on the state fisc. Rather than fully inves-
tigate Morrison's murder, police, prosecutors, and the judge
compromised their duty to the public and convicted McMillian.
Apparently, the case against McMillian was a total fabrication
from the beginning, implicating the police and the prosecutors in
unlawful conduct and fraud upon the court. In their zeal to at-
tribute Morrison's murder to someone, they found a vulnerable
Black defendant and they constructed a case against him. The
fraud was ultimately revealed when the principal witnesses for
the state recanted their trial testimony.
Until this writing, I had not been completely opposed to the
death penalty, but rather only to its disproportionate application
against poor, Black men accused of killing Whites. However, the
McMillian case is a compelling example of the worst kinds of
abuses within our criminal justice system and offers persuasive
evidence that we probably do execute innocent persons. That
reality places all of us at some risk, but it makes most vulnera-
ble citizens who live at the margins of society, especially those
who are despised and presumed guilty because of their race or
class. This concern for executing the innocent persuades me that
we need to re-examine the costs and benefits of long-term im-
prisonment in comparison to the costs and benefits of the death
penalty. Wrongful convictions, like McMillian's, offer the most
persuasive challenge to any use of the death penalty because it
is impossible to ensure that someone like him has not been
442 [Vol. 45:2:403
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railroaded to death row for a crime he did not commit.167
A. The Crime
On Saturday morning, November 1, 1986, at approximately
9:00, Ronda Morrison arrived for work at Jackson Cleaners in
downtown Monroeville, Alabama, where she had been employed
part-time for about one year." At 11:00 a.m., three customers
found Morrison dead."m
Further police investigation revealed that Morrison had
parked her automobile beside the building and entered the
building carrying a small money bag.17 Shortly thereafter, Ray
Owens entered the establishment to pick up some clothes that
he had previously left for cleaning.17' Owens reported that he
167. The late Justice Thurgood Marshall made this point eloquently in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367-68 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). He wrote: "No
matter how careful courts are, the possibility of perjured testimony, mistaken honest
testimony, and human error remain all too real. We have no way of judging how
many innocent persons have been executed but we can be certain that there were
some." Id.
168. McMillian v. State, 570 So. 2d 1285, 1287 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). The
evidence presented by the state is summarized in McMillian, 570 So. 2d at 1287-91.
That official summary, however, does not contain significant facts that were known
to law enforcement agents or prosecutors at the time of trial and that were withheld
from the defense lawyers. Therefore, I frequently cite to other original sources, such
as the Reporters Official Trial Transcript from the 1988 trial in State v. McMillian,
police records, forensics reports relating to the crime, the summary of facts from the
1993 appeal, or stories in the Monroe Journal.
169. Reporter's Official Transcript on Appeal [hereinafter Transcript] at 105-07.
170. Transcript at 85. Ray Owens testified that he was at the cleaners when
Morrison arrived at approximately 9:05 am. He said he waited for Morrison to
assist another customer before he went in. Transcript at 85. He said she was
putting money in the register when he entered the cleaners. Transcript at 86. He
gave her a $20 bill and she put the money in the register and gave him change.
Transcript at 85-86. Owens said Morrison was fine when he left, Transcript at 86,
and he did not see anyone else working in the cleaners that morning. Transcript at
90.
On cross-examination, defense lawyers asked Owens if he knew Miles Jackson
or Rick Blair. Transcript at 94-95. Owens said that he knew Miles Jackson as the
former owner of the cleaners and that he thought Rick Blair was the new owner.
Transcript at 94-95. He testified that he had seen Blair in the cleaners before when
he picked up his clothes, but that he did not see Blair on that Saturday morning.
Transcript at 95.
171. Transcript at 85.
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paid Morrison $13.00.172 As he left, he noticed that Morrison
was putting other money in the cash register.'73
Around 10:10 or 10:15 a.m., Jan Owen entered the estab-
lishment and left a skirt with Morrison for cleaning.174 She did
not see anyone else and did not observe anything unusual.'75
Around 10:40 or 10:45 a.m., Jerrie Sue Dunning entered the
establishment, and no one came to assist her. 6 She called out
several times, "Is anyone here?" She received no answer. 7 She
noticed that the cash register was open, and she testified that
she observed bills and change in the cash register.7 Shortly
thereafter, Florence Masons entered the establishment, and a
few minutes before 11:00 a.m., Coy Stacey entered.'79 Dunning,
Masons, and Stacey began a search and discovered Morrison's
body lying on the floor under a rack of clothing.s They called
the police.''
One of the first officers to arrive at Jackson Cleaners was
Lieutenant Woodrow Ikner of the Monroeville Police Depart-
ment."2 He arrived around 11:05 a.m.ls He recognized Mor-
rison as his son's classmate."s Ikner said she was lying face-
down, and there were blood stains on her face and on the back
of her shirt.s He checked for a pulse, but found none, and dis-
covered that the body was "cool. " s
Deputy Sheriff William Gibson took photographs of Morri-
son. 7 Her pants and shirt were unbuttoned, and her under-
garments were visible.' Three spent bullet casings and a part
172. Transcript at 86.
173. Transcript at 84-99.
174. Transcript at 99-100.
175. Transcript at 99-103.
176. Transcript at 104-05.
177. Transcript at 105.
178. Transcript at 106.
179. Transcript at 105.
180. Transcript at 107.
181. Transcript at 108.
182. Transcript at 124.
183. Transcript at 127.
184. Transcript at 125.
185. McMillian v. State, 570 So. 2d 1285, 1288 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
186. Id.; Transcript at 126-28.
187. Transcript at 151-53.
188. Transcript at 153. The condition of Morrison's clothing suggests that
someone might have attempted to sexually assault her in the bathroom; that she
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of a bullet were found near the body. Another spent casing was
found in the bathroom in the rear of the establishment, about
fifty feet from the body, and one was found outside the bathroom
door.
8 9
The bathroom showed signs of a scuffle. There was a bullet
hole in the bathroom ceiling, the victim's gold necklace was
found on the bathroom floor, a brick was found in the bathroom
with hair on it, and an impression in the wall was discovered
that had apparently been made by the brick being hurled
against the wall.1"c There was dust on the victim's clothing and
some indication that she had been dragged to the spot where her
body was found. 9' Ikner discovered one drop of blood on the
floor near the cash register."9 He dusted the cash register and
the area around it for fingerprints and found only unidentifiable
smudges."sc
Morrison was pronounced dead by Monroe County Coroner
Farrish Manning at 11:45 a.m."9 Dr. Gary Dean Cumberland,
a state pathologist with the Alabama Department of Forensic
Sciences, performed an autopsy on the victim's body the follow-
ing day.9" He found numerous scratches and bruises on the
right side of her neck and forehead."'c Three gunshot wounds
were discovered: one to the back side of her right shoulder, one
to the left side of her back, and one to the back side of her left
fled her attacker and was shot in the back. Yet, there is nothing in the trial tran-
script to indicate that police evaluated the case as a possible sexual assault or
attempted rape. The prosecutor, District Attorney Ted Pearson, did suggest in his
closing argument to the jury that McMillian might have tried to take advantage of
Morrison. Transcript at 534. Thus, one of the images left with the jury before its de-
liberations was that of a Black man attempting to sexually assault a young White
woman.
189. Transcript at 145-46.
190. Transcript at 142-43.
191. Transcript at 142, 154.
192. Transcript at 142.
193. Transcript at 126-27. The State Fingerprint Examiner in the Alabama De-
partment of Forensic Sciences testified that none of the evidence submitted to him
for examination had the requisite characteristics to make an identification.
Transcript at 169-71.
194. Transcript at 169.
195. Transcript at 241-56.
196. Transcript at 243.
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upper arm.' Three bullets were recovered from her body. 9"
The pathologist found that the cause of death was the three
gunshot wounds.'
A ballistics expert concluded that the three bullets recovered
from the victim's body were .25 caliber and that all were fired
from the same gun, probably from a semi-automatic manufac-
tured by Raven Arms Company.' He examined the bullet
holes in the victim's shirt and discovered powder residue around
one bullet hole.2"' He concluded that that bullet was fired from
within six inches of the victim's body.
202
From the statements of Owen, Dunning, and Stacey, the
police set the time of the robbery and murder between 10:15 and
10:45 a.m. Moreover, the inference created by the statements of
Owen and Dunning was that Owen was the last person known
to have seen Morrison alive.
However, according to an Alabama Department of Public
Safety Case Report, Miles Jackson, a prior owner of Jackson
Cleaners, was in the cleaners at 10:30 a.m.203 Therefore, Miles
Jackson, not Jan Owen, was the last person known by police to
have seen Morrison alive. This narrowed the window of time for
the Morrison crime to approximately fifteen minutes, between
10:30 and 10:45 a.m.
Who is Miles Jackson? Why was he at Jackson Cleaners
that morning? Did he have a personal relationship with the
victim? Why was he not a suspect in Morrison's murder or a
witness at McMillian's trial? None of these questions were
raised by defense lawyers because they were unaware of
Jackson's presence at the cleaners. Neither the police nor the
prosecution notified defense lawyers about Jackson's presence in
the cleaners on the morning of Morrison's murder, and they
failed to disclose the police report containing that information to
197. Transcript at 243.
198. Transcript at 251.
199. Transcript at 251-52.
200. Transcript at 174.
201. Transcript at 125.
202. Transcript at 175-76.
203. See Alabama Department of Public Safety Report, File No. 2100-102001-
451866, Oct. 7, 1987, at 2 (on file with the author). This report, which was an
exhibit in McMillian's appeal (Def.'s Ex. 7 at 199), identifies Miles Jackson as the
last person in Jackson Cleaners to see Morrison alive.
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McMillian's lawyers.' Defense lawyers did ask Ray Owens if
he knew Miles Jackson, and Owens responded that he knew
Jackson as the prior owner of the cleaners."°s Had McMillian's
lawyers known that Jackson was in the cleaners on the morning
Morrison was murdered, they surely would have asked him and
others many more questions. Thus, significant information was
intentionally concealed from the defense and jury. The conceal-
ment of the police report was just part of a much larger set of
acts by the police and prosecutors - directed at convicting
McMillian despite the existence of exculpatory evidence and
McMillian's claims of innocence.
The crime attracted statewide attention from law enforce-
ment agencies, including the Monroeville Police and Sheriffs De-
partments, the Alabama Bureau of Investigation, and the state
Department of Forensic Sciences.2" In addition, local compa-
nies, the Monroeville City Council, and the Governor offered
reward money totaling $16,000 for information leading to the
arrest and conviction of Morrison's killer."'
The police had no solid leads or suspects because there was
no physical evidence at the crime scene or forensic evidence
found on the victim suggesting who had murdered Morrison.
William Dailey, the Monroeville Chief of Police, told the Monroe
Journal that his officers -were interviewing every person they
could identify who had gone to the cleaners on November L2
Within four days of Morrison's murder, law enforcement
officials submitted fingerprints, clothing, and blood samples to
the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences from a suspect
named Albaro Banos.2" The forensic report initially described
204. McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933, 942 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). McMillian's
trial lawyers, J.L. Chestnut and Bruce Boynton of Selma, must share in the blame
for his conviction. Neither did an adequate job to investigate McMillian's claims of
innocence. Their lack of effort was magnified by the deliberate misconduct of the
prosecutor and law enforcement agencies.
205. Transcript at 94.
206. See Patrice Stewart & Mary F. Lett, No Arrest Made in Murder, MONROE
J., Nov. 6, 1986, at Al [hereinafter No Arrest].
207. See Patrice Stewart & Mary F. Lett, Murder Reward is $16,000, MONROE J.,
Nov. 13, 1986, at Al [hereinafter Reward].
208. No Arrest, supra note 206, at Al.
209. See Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences Report, Case No. 87-30271,
Nov. 6, 1986 (hereinafter DFS -Report] (on file with the author).
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Banos as a White adult male, but the racial classification was
subsequently changed to Oriental.21 On November 10, 1986,
the forensic specialists examined several strands of head hair
from Maria Diaz. It is unclear what led police to either
Banos or Diaz, or if there was some relationship between them.
There is no mention of either person in the trial transcript.
1 2
After November 19, 1986, it appears that the forensic experts
concluded there was insufficient evidence to link Banos to the
Morrison murder.1 3
While Monroe Countians were organizing Ronda Morrison
Day and raising money for a scholarship in her memory,24 po-
lice investigators continued to pursue leads. Former District
Attorney Ted Pearson, who was the prosecutor in the trial
against Walter McMillian, told the Monroe Journal in early
December, 1986, that despite rumors to the contrary, police had
not found a witness to the crime, although they had heard from




Police did not make an arrest in the Morrison case until
early June, 1987, seven months after her murder. The events
leading to the arrest of Ralph Myers and Walter McMillian are
illustrative of how police sometimes conduct investigations di-
rected at proving one suspect's guilt rather than towards identi-
fying who among possible suspects committed the crime. When
police do the former, there is a greater likelihood that they will
ignore or conceal exculpatory evidence, fabricate evidence, physi-
cally or mentally abuse suspects, or in some other way violate
the rights of the accused and the trust placed in them by soci-
210. DFS Report, Nov. 12, 1986.
211. DFS Report, Nov. 10, 1986.
212. The absence of any reference of Banos or Diaz from the trial transcript
suggests that McMillian's trial lawyers missed the evidence or that the forensic
reports were not disclosed to the defense prior to the trial.
213. See DFS Memorandum to File, Dec. 3, 1986, at 2-3 (on file with the author).
214. Rhoda W. King & Patrice Stewart, Scholarship Committee Sets Saturday
Cookout, MONROE J., Dec. 4, 1986, at A2.





Police were led to Ralph Myers while investigating another
murder in a nearby county. Vicki Lynn Pittman, also eighteen
years old, was reported missing in late February, 1987, from
Escambia County. Her body was found on a dirt road in the
Brooklyn community near East Brewton on March 29, 1987.217
Isaac Charles Dailey of Atmore, arrested in Monroe County
on March 25, 1987, on forgery charges, was charged with
Pittman's murder.2" Dailey made statements to the police that
implicated Ralph Myers and Karen Kelly in the Pittman mur-
der.219 He suggested that Myers and Kelly had murdered
Pittman and that they were planning to put it off on another
person, Johnnie D. Williams.22 Neither the police nor the pros-
ecution gave defense counsel the Dailey statement."
In late May or early June, 1987, police arrested Ralph
Myers as a second suspect in the Pittman murder.2' Agent Si-
mon Benson of the Alabama Bureau of Investigation and Inves-
tigator Larry Ikner of the Monroe County District Attorney's
office took a sworn statement from Myers regarding his involve-
ment in the Pittman murder and his prior statements to police
in East Brewton.'
Benson informed Myers that he knew Myers had lied in
earlier statements.' He told Myers that he had testimony
216. For a summary of other wrongful convictions involving corrupt law enforce-
ment or prosecutor practices, see RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 141-93.
217. Mary F. Lett, Forgery Ring Linked to Death in Escambia, MONROE J., June
11, 1987, at Al.
218. Id.
219. Statement of Isaac Charles Dailey, Aug. 27, 1987 (on file with the author).
220. Id. at 2.
221. McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933, 942 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
222. There is some uncertainty about this date. The Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals indicated that Myers was arrested on June 3. McMillian, 616 So. 2d at 942.
The transcript also indicates early June. Transcript at 371. However, Ikner indicates
that Myers was arrested on May 29. Statement of Ralph Myers, June 1, 1987, at 5
(on file with the author).
223. Statement of Ralph Myers, June 1, 1987. Apparently, Myers had provided
police with some information relating to the Pittman murder prior to his arrest,
perhaps in the capacity of a police informant.
224. See id, at 4-36. Most of Myers's statement relates to questions from Benson
about evidence connecting Myers to the Pittman murder. Benson alleged that he had
evidence implicating Myers, Isaac Dailey, Karen Kelly, and Johnnie D. Williams (aka
Walter McMillian) in Pittman's death. Id.
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from Isaac Dailey and Karen Kelly relating to Myers's participa-
tion in Pittman's murder. Benson also informed Myers that he
had personal knowledge that Myers had lied to him and another
officer regarding the whereabouts of a gun that had been used to
beat Pittman.
Most significantly, Benson told Myers that he had new in-
formation connecting Myers to the Ronda Morrison murder.'
Benson said that Myers's wife had told him that Myers had
asked her if she knew Ronda.' This exchange between
Benson and Myers was the first indication that the police would
link the Pittman and Morrison murders.
Just as Isaac Dailey had warned, Myers told Benson and
Ikner that Karen Kelly and Johnnie D. (McMillian) had killed
Pittman over a drug deal. 7 He told them he had loaned Kelly
and Johnnie D. his truck one evening and that when he got it
back he noticed blood in the back of it.' He reported that
when he inquired about the blood, Kelly and Johnnie D. threat-
ened him and his family.' With respect to Myers asking his
wife whether she knew Ronda, Myers said he was asking about
a person who had worked at a Piggly Wiggly and Waffle House
in Evergreen.' Myers's statement of June 1, 1987, was
withheld from McMillian's lawyers."2 Since Larry Ikner was
then the investigator for Ted Pearson, the decision to withhold
the Myers's statement probably was made by Pearson.
Two days later, in a second statement at the Monroe County
Jail, Benson, Larry Ikner, and Sheriff Tom Tate questioned
Myers.2 During that interrogation, the police suggested that
they believed Myers, Dailey, Kelly, and Johnnie D. were in-
volved in not only the Pittman murder, but also the Morrison
225. Id. at 36.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 43-44.
228. Statement of Ralph Myers, June 1, 1987, at 53-60.
229. Id. at 60-64.
230. Id. at 36.
231. McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933, 942 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
232. Statement of Ralph Myers, June 3, 1987, at 1 (on file with the author). In
this statement Myers alleged that Johnnie D. (aka Walter McMillian) and another
man raped him. Id. at 3. Police arrested McMillian for criminal sodomy based on
Myers's allegations. Mary F. Lett, McMillian is Charged with Sodomy, MONROE J.,
June 16, 1987, at A2.
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murder.' They asked Myers to tell them "why Johnnie D. had
you kill Ronda Morrison."' Myers responded that he "didn't
kill Ronda Morrison" and that "Johnnie D. didn't get me to kill
Ronda Morrison."' Myers categorically denied any involve-
ment in the Morrison murder." When the police informed him
that they had witnesses who would testify that Johnnie D. hired
Myers to kill Morrison, Myers said that the witnesses were lying
and that he would be willing to take a polygraph test about the
Morrison murder. 7 Myers's statement from June 3, 1987, that
he and Johnnie D. had had nothing to do with the Morrison
murder was also withheld from the defense lawyers.' The
egregious concealment of Myers's second statement implicates
not only the prosecutor, but also the sheriff and an agent of the
Alabama Bureau of Investigation in fraud upon the court and
the public. Their conduct evidences a disdain for the rights of
the criminally accused and a contempt for the rule of law.
The June 3 statement did not provide the police with any
direct evidence about the Morrison murder. However, the nature
of the questioning made it plain that the police had decided to
resolve the Morrison case by attributing it to Isaac Dailey, Ka-
ren Kelly, Ralph Myers, and/or Johnnie D. (aka Walter
McMillian). They first needed a parrot to mimic their tale, and
Ralph Myers was almost perfect. He learned their tale as sedu-
lously as one with only an elementary education could and even-
tually parrotted the tale in two subsequent statements.
As the police strategy unfolded, Walter McMillian became
the scapegoat. Why the police chose to blame McMillian rather
than one of the others for Morrison's murder is anyone's guess,
but it should not be overlooked that McMillian is Black and
uneducated, and, therefore, vulnerable. He was also allegedly
having an affair with a White woman, which probably did not
make him very popular in local circles. 9 A case could be made
233. Statement of Ralph Myers, June 3, 1987, at 5.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 5-6.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 7-8.
238. McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933, 942 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
239. Transcript at 379. The prosecution made a point to have Myers describe
Karen Kelly, a White woman, as McMillian's girlfriend. Transcript at 380.
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against him without much objection from anyone who mattered.
On June 7, 1987, police arrested Walter McMillian on sod-
omy charges arising from the statements made by Ralph Myers
four days earlier.24 McMillian was taken into custody and the
police impounded his truck. While the truck was outside the
Monroe County Jail, it was apparently shown to Ralph Myers
and William Hooks and later to Joe Hightower. They would ulti-
mately testify against McMillian and identify his vehicle as
having been at the crime scene on the morning Morrison was
killed. It is now obvious that the police tampered with the evi-
dence because Myers and Hooks described the truck with modifi-
cations that were not made until six months after Morrison's
murder. The truck that they described did not exist in November
1986.24'
While McMillian was in custody, a second warrant was
issued, charging him and Myers with the Morrison murder. On
June 9, 1987, Ralph Myers gave a third statement to the po-
lice.242 In this statement, Myers incriminated McMillian in the
Morrison murder.24' The statement reads as if Myers had been
poorly coached to testify against McMillian, and there are seg-
ments of the statement where law enforcement officers essential-
ly tell Myers what to say.' Unlike the prior exculpatory state-
ments by Myers, his June 9 statement was given to the de-
fense.24'
The police needed more than a statement from Myers to
240. Since the police arrested McMillian on the sodomy charge, they presumably
did not have sufficient evidence to link him to the scene of the Morrison crime.
That information would be provided later in subsequent statements by Ralph Myers
and William Hooks.
241. For a discussion of how the truck was impounded and defense lawyers'
objection to the identification evidence regarding McMillian's truck, see McMillian v.
State, 594 So. 2d 1253, 1268-69 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). Myers's, Hooks's, and
Hightower's testimony was discredited because at the trial they described McMillian's
truck as a low rider. On appeal, McMillian produced evidence that he did not have
his truck modified to sit low to the ground until May, 1987, over six months after
Morrison was killed. The police were unaware of that fact when they showed
McMillian's truck to the principal prosecution witnesses.
242. Statement of Ralph Myers, June 9, 1987 (on file with the author).
243. Id. at 3-8.
244. Id. For example, when the police asked Myers about the route he and
McMillian had travelled to Monroeville, Myers could not provide an answer without
guidance from them. Id. at 3-4.
245. McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933, 941 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
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obtain a conviction against McMillian." Interestingly, also on
June 9, 1987, William "Bill" Hooks gave a statement to Benson
and. Ikner that he had seen McMillian's truck outside Jackson
Cleaners on November 1, 1986, the morning that Ronda Mor-
rison was killed.' 7 Hooks said that Ralph Myers was driving
the truck and he saw McMillian running to the truck and the
two of them speeding away from the cleaners." Hooks said he
recognized McMillian because he had previously worked for him
as a mechanic. 9 He also said that he recognized Myers from a
picture in the paper." Hooks was in jail at the time for un-
related criminal charges, and he was released from jail the same
day that he made his statement incriminating McMillian. 1
In July, 1987, the District Attorney filed a motion to trans-
fer McMillian from Monroe County Jail to a more secure state
prison. 2 Ostensibly, the reason for the transfer was that
threats allegedly had been made against McMillian. McMillian
spent most of the next six years at Holman Prison in Atmore,
Alabama on Death Row.
In a related matter, the Monroe County District Attorney's
office and local law enforcement officials recommended to the
local judge that charges and fines pending against Bill Hooks be
dropped.2' Hooks also collected approximately $5000 in re-
ward money for his testimony against McMillian.' McMillian
claimed at his trial and appeal that Hooks had received favor-
246. Testimony of a codefendant must be independently corroborated. ALA. CODE
§ 12-21-222 (1986).
247. Statement of William Hooks, June 9, 1987 (on file with the author). Hooks
said that on the morning of November 1, 1986, he was working at a used car lot
and had to go to a parts store. Id. at 6. He said that as he returned to the lot, he
passed by Jackson Cleaners and saw Walter McMillian and Ralph Myers in a green
truck. Id
248. Id. at 1-5.
249. Id. at 3.
250. Id. at 6. Hooks's statement also reveals that he saw McMillian's truck at
the Monroe County Jail on June 9, 1987. He said the truck had since been painted
black, but he had seen green paint in the tailgate area that confirmed for him this
was the same truck he had seen at Jackson Cleaners. Id. at 7-8. Hooks also said
that he saw the truck parked in the driveway on the south side of the cleaners. Id.
at 6-7.
251. McMillian v. State, 594 So. 2d 1253, 1258-60 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
252. Transcript at 637.
253. McMillian, 594 So. 2d at 1258-60.
254. Statement of William Hooks, Jan. 18, 1993 (on file with the author).
19941 453
Alabama Law Review
able consideration from the prosecution and therefore was not a
credible witness. 5
On September 14, 1987, Myers gave yet another statement
to the police.' It too incriminated McMillian. Myers's Septem-
ber statement was the essence of his total testimony. The
esential difference between the third and fourth statements by
Myers was that he said nothing about entering the cleaners in
the third.1
7
In October, 1987, a Monroe County grand jury indicted
McMillian and Myers on capital murder charges.' For his
agreement to testify against McMillian, the prosecution made a
deal with Myers that his life would be spared, and he would be
permitted to plead guilty to a lesser offense and serve a limited
sentence for the Pittman murder. 9
Lawyers for the defendants sought to sever the trials and
moved for a change of venue because of extensive pretrial pub-
licity.2s The judge agreed to sever the trials and granted a
change of venue to Bay Minette, Alabama, in Baldwin Coun-
ty."' In November, 1987, McMillian's lawyers, J.L. Chestnut
and Bruce Boynton of Selma, filed a motion for discovery pursu-
ant to Brady v. Maryland.262 Brady requires the prosecution to
give the defense all evidence in its possession favorable to the
defendant on the issue of guilt upon request.2" The
prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence that is
material to either guilt or punishment violates the Due Process
255. McMillian v. State, 570 So. 2d 1285, 1295 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
256. Statement of Ralph Myers, Sept. 14, 1987 (on file with the author).
257. Transcript at 350, 353-54. Since Myers's first two statements had not been
disclosed, the defense counsel refers to Myers's third and fourth statements as the
first and second statements.
258. Transcript at 641. Because of a defect in the first indictment, McMillian and
Myers were reindicted in December, 1987. See McMillian, 570 So. 2d at 1286.
259. There was no dispute that Myers received a deal in exchange for his tes-
timony. Instead, a dispute arose regarding whether the prosecution disclosed the
terms of its agreement with Myers to defense counsel. McMillian's lawyers would
allege that the prosecution did not reveal the terms of its agreement with Myers as
the law required. In January, 1989, Myers entered a plea of guilty for his alleged
role in the Morrison crime. He was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. McMillian,
570 So. 2d at 1293.
260. Transcript at 663-64.
261. Transcript at 666-67.
262. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
263. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
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Clause.2' The Supreme Court has said that evidence is materi-
al if there is a reasonable probability that disclosure of the evi-
dence would have caused a different result by the jury.' The
failure to disclose exculpatory witness statements would serve as
a principal part of McMillian's appeals and was ultimately the
basis for the reversal of his conviction and death sentence.2'
C. The Trial
The .trial finally began on August 15, 1988.'c7 The trial
lasted only two and one-half days, including the time necessary
to empanel a jury. Undoubtedly, it was shortened in part by the
failure of the prosecution to disclose material, exculpatory evi-
dence to the defense. Moreover, a review of the trial transcript
suggests that the trial judge seemed interested in quickly com-
pleting the trial.'
The prosecution's case was simple: McMillian killed Morri-
son during the course of a robbery. He may also have tried to
take advantage of her sexually.2 9 His crime was punishable by
death, and the prosecutor determined that a death sentence was
appropriate. It strikes me as extraordinary that a prosecutor
would conceal exculpatory evidence from the defense in violation
of Brady and then seek the death penalty against the defendant.
Regrettably, this type of conduct appears far more prevalent
264. Id.
265. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
266. McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933, 947-48 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
267. The trial had been scheduled to begin in February, 1987; however, the
prosecution requested a continuance when Ralph Myers, its chief witness, refused to
testify. See Transcript at 350-52, 743. Myers was then ordered to undergo psycholog-
ical evaluations at Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility to determine if he was
competent to *stand trial. McMillian, 616 So. 2d at 938. While at Taylor Hardin,
Myers told four doctors during separate evaluations that he was being coerced to
testify falsely about the Morrison murder. Id. There is no indication in the record
that McMillian's lawyers sought to discover the Taylor Hardin records, and those
records were not disclosed to the defense lawyers until after McMillian's conviction.
Id. at 948.
268. See, e.g., Transcript at 84, 123, 144, 205-06, 303-04, 331.
269. The prosecution made this point in its summation. Transcript at 534. In
doing so, it invoked one of the principal myths about Black men as brutes with




than I ever imagined, and it appears prosecutors who commit
such acts go unpunished.27
The principal prosecution witnesses were Ralph Myers,
William Hooks, Joe Hightower, and, on rebuttal, Ernest Welch.
Myers testified that, on the day Morrison was murdered,
McMillian asked him to drive McMillian's green Chevrolet truck
from Evergreen to Monroeville so McMillian could "take care of
some business."27' He said that he drove for McMillian because
McMillian's arm was "hurting."
272
According to Myers, after they arrived in Monroeville,
McMillian directed him to park in a shopping center parking lot
near a Piggly Wiggly store and next to Jackson Cleaners.'
Myers said McMillian got out of the truck, said he would be
back in a minute, and went toward Jackson Cleaners.274 In a
few minutes, McMillian returned to the truck and said that he
was sorry it was taking so long and that "they had not found
what he was looking for."275 Myers said McMillian went back
into Jackson Cleaners and, a short time later, came out
again.276 He again said he was sorry it was taking so long and
that Myers should go to a store if he needed anything. 277 After
McMillian went back toward Jackson Cleaners, Myers said he
drove to a gas station and bought some cigarettes.278
Myers said he returned in about ten minutes and parked in
approximately the same location.279 He observed an automobile
parked in front of the cleaners and observed two men go inside
and come back with some clothes.' Then he heard "popping
noises" coming from inside the building and, in two or three sec-
onds, heard them again."' The noises sounded like firecrack-
270. For a recent article regarding the debate over the effectiveness of the Brady
rule, see Cris Carmody, The Brady Rule: Is It Working?, NAT'L L.J., May 17, 1993,
at 1, 30.
271. Transcript at 313-91.
272. Transcript at 315.
273. Transcript at 319.
274. Transcript at 320.
275. Transcript at 320.
276. Transcript at 320-21.
277. Transcript at 321.
278. Transcript at 321-22.
279. Transcript at 322.
280. Transcript at 323.
281. Transcript at 323-24.
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ers."2 Myers testified that he went into the cleaners, where he
saw McMillian kneeling down behind the counter, taking money
out of a paper sack, and putting it in a brown "zip-up case."
He also saw a young girl lying on the floor with her mouth
about half open.' Myers said McMillian had a small caliber
automatic pistol in his hand.'
Myers said he returned to the truck and, in a few minutes,
McMillian came out and "told me to get [him] out of there, [h]is
arm was hurting."' He said McMillian was carrying a "little
brown satchel," which was bulging out from "stuff that was in it"
and, from the imprint on the satchel, it looked like there was a
gun in it."e7 They were back in Evergreen before lumch.2
There are several issues raised by Myers's testimony. First,
much of it conflicted with pretrial statements Myers made to the
police. Myers's statements evolved from a total denial of any
knowledge about the Morrison case into a detailed account of the
crime.' Therefore, when the prosecution told the jury that
Myers had told essentially the same story from the very begin-
ning, that was untrue.' Second, only two of the four state-
282. Transcript at 323-24
283. Transcript at 324-25.
284. Transcript at 325. This testimony contradicted statements by Woodrow Ikner
that Morrison's body was lying face down until he turned her over. Transcript at
126-28.
285. Transcript at 325. Myers said when McMillian saw him, McMillian grabbed
him and shoved him against the wall. Transcript at 327. Myers said he heard the
voice of another person in the back of the cleaners, and he observed the back of a
White man with shoulder-length, "[b]lackish-grayish hair," who was carrying some-
thing in his hand that looked like a piece of pipe. Transcript at 331-32. The man
hollered for McMillian and said, "How am I going to get out of here without him
seeing me?" Transcript at 333. Myers heard "mumbling" and voices in the rear of
the cleaners and heard someone say, "Get the stuff and get out of here." Transcript
at 333. A voice said, "You need to get rid of him too." Transcript at 333. McMillian
said, in response, that he could not because he was "out of-something." Transcript at
333-34. Myers said McMillian threatened him, telling him he would kill him, his
wife, and his kids if he ever said anything and told him to go outside. Transcript at
334.
286. Transcript at 335.
287. Transcript at 335-36.
288. Transcript at 338.
289. In all, Myers made four statements to law enforcement personnel about the
Morrison case. Statements of Ralph Myers, June 1, 3, and 9, 1987, and September
14, 1987.
290. Transcript at 542-43.
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ments from Myers were disclosed to the defense, preventing
McMillian from fully attacking Myers's credibility. Thus, the
prosecution had information from Myers that was inconsistent
with his trial testimony, and they kept that information from
the defendant, the jurors, and the judge.
What is most remarkable about Myers's testimony is the
amount of time that he suggested elapsed between their arrival
and departure from the cleaners. Myers said that McMillian
went in and out of the cleaners at least three times. Myers said
that McMillian returned to the truck twice and apologized for it
taking him so long. Myers also testified that he left for ten min-
utes to go buy cigarettes. It seems ludicrous that in the course of
a robbery and murder, the assailant would invite his driver to go
buy cigarettes. Yet that was the nature of Myers's testimony.
None of the lawyers at the trial pinned Myers down for a
specific estimate of the length of time he and McMillian were al-
legedly in Jackson Cleaners. The implication from Myers's testi-
mony was that they were at the cleaners for perhaps thirty to
forty-five minutes. Thus, the difficulty with Myers's testimony is
that other evidence from the police, and from Jan Owen and
Jerrie Sue Dunning suggested that this crime occurred within a
period of fifteen minutes, between 10:30 and 10:45 a.m.
McMillian's lawyers were unaware of the evidence regarding
Miles Jackson's presence in the cleaners at 10:30 a.m., and none
of the prosecutors bothered to note this discrepancy to the jury.
William Hooks testified that on the day of Morrison's mur-
der, he was working at Kenny Blanton's Car Repair about three
or four miles from Jackson Cleaners; 1 that "about the middle
of the morning" he went to Taylor's Parts in Monroeville to buy
some parts for an automobile that he was working on;' and
that as he was passing Jackson Cleaners on his way back to
Blanton's, he saw McMillian's truck parked there. 3 Hooks
said he saw Ralph Myers in the truck on the driver's side, and
291. Transcript at 257.
292. Transcript at 258.
293. Transcript at 258. This testimony was controversial because Myers testified
that he had parked in the lot adjacent to the cleaners rather than at the cleaners.




McMillian was getting in the truck.' He said he knew
McMillian because he had done work for him." He was famil-
iar with McMillian's truck; he described it as a green, low,
down-to-the-ground Chevrolet truck; and he had never seen
anyone besides McMillian drive the vehicle.'
Hooks testified that the truck "speeded out" and went on
down the highway and, about five minutes later, he heard the
police and ambulance sirens going up the road toward Jackson
Cleaners.' He said, sometime later, he saw the truck at the
Monroe County Jail and noted that it had been painted black,
but that the interior of the truck bed was still green."9
Joe Hightower, a twenty-two-year-old welder, testified that
"sometime up in the morning" on the day of the killing, he was
passing by Jackson Cleaners and observed McMillian's truck
"sitting at the cleaners."' He said he knew the truck well,
having seen it "[a] good number of times."' He testified that
he had been to McMillian's house and had seen the truck
there."cl He described the truck as a green, low-rider type.c2
- He observed no other vehicles at the cleaners at that time.s
After observing the truck, he went home and, around noon or
1:00 p.m., his wife told him about hearing of the incident that
had just occurred at the cleaners.' He remembered that he
had seen McMillian's truck at the cleaners, but he did not report
it.3
05
On cross-examination, Hightower testified that he gave the
information to the sheriff a few days before the commencement
of the trial and, when asked why he had not come forward soon-
294. Transcript at 258.
295. Transcript at 259-60.
296. Transcript at 260-61.
297. Transcript at 261.
298. The record does not report that Hooks and another prosecution witness were
the principal recipients of reward money offered for their testimony against
McMillian. See Statement of William Hooks, Jan. 18, 1993, at 2.
299. Transcript at 224.
300. Transcript at 224.
301. Transcript at 224.
302. Transcript at 224.
303. Transcript at 228.
304. Transcript at 227.
305. Transcript at 228.
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er, he stated that he was scared.' On redirect, the prosecutor
asked him why he was scared, and he stated, "Just because the
reasons I have been to his house."0 7 The prosecutor then
asked, "Mr. Hightower, why were you scared to come forward
with this information?" He replied, "Because when you fool with
drugs and you don't know, if you get involved with something
like that it could cause [sic] you your life, too."3" Hightower's
testimony about drugs had to influence the jurors' view of
McMillian and defense lawyers sought a mistrial, but their re-
quest was refused.'09
McMillian did not testify. However, he called several wit-
nesses in an effort to cast doubt upon the testimony of Myers,
Hooks, and Hightower and to establish an alibi.
William Tidmore was called as a defense witness and, on
direct examination, testified that Hooks told him sometime after
the date of the murder that he may have seen McMillian's truck
parked at Jackson Cleaners on that date, but did not give him
the names of any persons he may have seen.310 However, on
cross-examination, he testified that he had previously told
Sheriff Thomas Tate about Hooks's coming back from
Monroeville after going for automobile parts on the date of the
incident, about hearing sirens "going off," and about Hooks's
saying something must have happened at Jackson Cleaners.31'
On redirect; Tidmore said Hooks never told him that he had
seen Myers and McMillian at Jackson Cleaners."2
Minnie McMillian, McMillian's wife, testified that Hooks
came to her home a few days after McMillian was arrested for
the murder and said nothing about seeing McMillian and Myers
at Jackson Cleaners on the date of the incident.1 3 She also
testified that, on the date of the murder, McMillian was home
all day except for about ten minutes when he went to his
brother's to borrow a pot for frying fish; that the transmission
306. Transcript at 226.39.
307. Transcript at 236.
308. Transcript at 239.
309. Transcript at 224-26, 236-39.
310. Transcript at 391-97.
311. Transcript at 393-96.
312. Transcript at 397.
313. Transcript at 397-98.
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had been removed from his truck on that date; and that a fish
fry was held at McMillian's home on that date. " She testified
that she was certain about the date because Ernest Welch, a
man who collects for a furniture company in Monroeville, came
out that day to collect from her mother; that he always comes on
the first of the month; and that he never missed coming on the
first. 15 She also testified that Welch stopped by where Jimmy
D. Hunter and McMillian were working on McMillian's truck
and told them that Welch's niece had been killed that day at
Jackson Cleaners. 1'
Jimmy D. Hunter testified that he worked on the transmis-
sion of McMillian's truck on the date of the murder; that
McMillian was home all day; that Welch, the collector for a fur-
niture company, came by; that he knew Welch and had an ac-
count with him; and that Welch told him and McMillian about
his niece being killed at Jackson Cleaners.1 7
James Franklin McMillian, McMillian's brother, testified
that he saw McMillian and Hunter about 7:00 a.m. at
McMillian's home on the date of the murder; that they were
working on McMillian's truck; that he passed McMillian's house
several times that day and that he saw him on each occasion;
that McMillian came to his house and borrowed a pot for frying
fish; that when he came for the pot, he was driving a vehicle
other than his truck; and that McMillian was at home all
morning.
318
Evelene Smith, McMilian's sister, testified that she arrived
at McMillian's home on the date of the incident at about 10:15
a.m.; that he was there when she arrived; that she did not see
him leave that morning; and that she saw Hunter and Welch
there. 9 She further testified that Louise Gibbs came and said,
"Sister, we would have done been [sic] over here but the reason
we [are] late [is] because Ronda got killed right there where you
work at the cleaners.""2 Smith also testified that FBI men had
314. Transcript at 405-06.
315. Transcript at 406.
316. Transcript at 406.
317. Transcript at 411-22.
318. Transcript at 423-31.
319. Transcript at 432-34.
320. Transcript at 435.
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come to the house that morning and had stopped her daughter-
in-law as she drove into McMillian's driveway and asked if she
had loaned her car to anyone. 21
Doris Stevens Hand, who is married to McMillian's nephew,
testified that she observed McMillian at his home on the date of
the incident from 10:30 a.m. to noon; that he never left his
house; and that she and McMillian talked with the "fish
man."
322
Carolyn McMillian, who is married to the son of McMillian's
sister, Evelene Smith, testified that she saw McMillian at his
home when she arrived between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m. on the
date of the incident; that she remained there until it became
dark; that McMillian was there the entire time; that she saw the
"fish man" and the "furniture man," who are both White, come
by; and that, about noon, Louise Gibbs came by and told them
about the killing."s She also testified that she and her mother-
in-law, Evelene Smith, had gone to the courthouse the day after
the incident and told Sheriff Tate and other officers that
McMillian was at home all day on the day of the incident.3"
Sheriff Tate was called as a witness for the defense and
asked if he remembered Carolyn McMillian and her mother-in-
law coming to the courthouse and telling him and other officers
that on the date of the incident, McMillian was at home all
day." Tate testified that he had seen Mrs. Smith talking with
one of the officers, but he could not recall such a conversa-
tion."
The state called Ernest Welch in rebuttal. 27 Welch testi-
fied that he had been a furniture salesman for twenty-two years;
that the victim was his niece; that she was killed on Saturday,
November 1, 1986; that he did not see McMillian on the date
that his niece was killed; that he did not go to McMillian's house
on that date, but had gone to his house on Friday, October 31,
1986, to collect from McMillian's mother-in-law, Ida Bell Ander-
321. Transcript at 436-40.
322. Transcript at 440-47.
323. Transcript at 447-51.
324. Transcript at 458-60.
325. Transcript at 461.
326. Transcript at 461-62.
327. Transcript at 467-88.
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son, who lived behind McMillian; that he did not see Hunter and
the others who testified that they had seen him at McMillian's
house on November 1, 1986, because he did not go there on that
date; and that government checks "come out" on Friday when
the first of the month is on Saturday, which was why he had
called on Anderson to collect on Friday, October 31." He iden-
tified the collection records of the furniture company, which
were kept in the ordinary course of business, and the records
showed that he collected payment for furniture from Anderson
on October 31, 1986."2
On August 17, 1988, a Baldwin County jury found
McMillian guilty of the capital murder during the course of a
robbery.3 0 The jury apparently believed Myers, Hooks,
Hightower, and Welch despite the fact that Myers made a deal
with prosecutors; Hooks and Hightower both obtained portions
of the reward money for information leading to a conviction in
the Morrison case; and Welch was Morrison's uncle.
A sentencing hearing immediately followed the guilt phase
of the trial, in accordance with sections 13A-5-43 to -46 of the
Alabama Code, and the jury returned an advisory verdict recom-
mending that the penalty be life imprisonment without the pos-
sibility of parole. Five jurors recommended the death penalty,
and seven recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without
parole."1 Since Alabama law requires at least ten jurors to
concur in an advisory verdict recommending death, McMillian's
jury was five votes short. 2 However, the jury verdict is only
advisory. The trial judge has the final word.
On September 19, 1988, the trial judge held another sen-
tencing hearing, in accordance with sections 13A-5-47 to -52 of
the Alabama Code, and after weighing the aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances and considering the jury's recommenda-
tion, overrode the jury verdict and sentenced McMillian to
328. Transcript at 468-81.
329. Transcript at 479-81.
330. Transcript at 578.
331. Transcript at 610.
332. Section 13A-5-46(f) of the Alabama Code requires that an advisory verdict
recommending death be based on a vote of at least 10 jurors, and a verdict recom-
mending life imprisonment without the possibility of parole must be based on a vote
of a majority of the jurors. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(f) (1982).
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death.' Alabama is the only death penalty state that permits
a trial judge to override the jury verdict without requiring any
level of deference.' It is estimated that a quarter of prisoners
on death row in Alabama were sent there by trial judges after
juries voted for verdicts of life imprisonment without parole.'
This enormous power is subject to abuse when judges, like other
agents of the criminal justice system, are imbued with racial
animus, or when they act in the face of perjured or concealed
information.
To the end, McMillian proclaimed his innocence. When
asked if he had anything to say before his sentence was im-
posed, he said, "Well, the only thing I can say, I am not guilty. I
like for that girl's parents to know that I did not kill their
daughter. I want them to know that." "a
D. The Appeal
In a paradoxical way, Judge Key's override of the jury ver-
dict was McMillian's first break in the case. There are so few
indigent defense agencies working on capital murder cases that
it is most unlikely that any agency would have taken special
note of the McMillian case if the judge had let stand a jury ver-
dict of life imprisonment without parole. The resources simply
are not available to represent every death row inmate. This is
partly true because in Alabama there is no state-wide public
defender agency to provide counseling or direct representation.
It is also the case because private lawyers have few economic in-
centives for taking on such specialized cases given the statutory
caps on what can be billed. 7 Finally, defense lawyers must
petition the court to approve funds to investigate the defense
333. Transcript at 616-28. The trial judge said that aggravating circumstances
existed, namely the commission of murder in the course of a robbery and the killing
was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. He found no mitigating circumstances
other than the jury's verdict. He concluded: "In the mind of this Court, the only
appropriate sentence in this case is death by electrocution." Transcript at 626.
334. See Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 45, at 14 nn.64-65.
335. Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 45, at 14-15 n.67.
336. Transcript at 626.
337. The state pays capital attorneys $20 per hour for out-of-court work and $40
per hour for in-court representation. In addition, a capital attorney can be paid no
more than $1000 for out-of-court work. ALA. CODE § 15-12-21(d) (1982).
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and approval is discretionary with the court."
McMillian's second break came when Bryan Stevenson and
Eva Ansley began an initiative in Alabama in the fall of 1988 to
assist recently sentenced death row prisoners who were indigent
and requesting legal assistance. In 1989, the Alabama Capital
Representation Resource Center was founded with Stevenson
serving as Executive Director.
After meeting with McMillian, Stevenson and staff, along
with Resource Center volunteers, led the effort to reinvestigate
the Morrison murder and McMiflian's claims that he did not kill
her. During thousands of hours of interviews and examinations
of the trial and appellate record, 9 the Resource Center uncov-
ered significant exculpatory evidence that had not been disclosed
to the defense or reported to the jury.' For example, it was
the Resource Center that accidently found a recording of Myers's
exculpatory statements about McMillian. The Resource Center
confirmed that McMillian's truck was not a low-rider on Novem-
ber 1, 1986. It found evidence that Myers did not know
McMillian in March, 1987, some four months after they alleged-
ly committed the Morrison crime. The Resource Center found
evidence that before McMillian's trial, Myers told four doctors
during a court-ordered psychological examination that he was
about to frame an innocent man for murder; the reports of
Myers's evaluation were sent to the prosecutor and to the court
clerk, but were never disclosed to the defense lawyers or the
jury. The Resource Center also found a report prepared by the
Alabama Bureau of Investigation from October, 1987, which
confirmed that Miles Jackson was in Jackson Cleaners at 10:30
a.m. on the morning of the murder and that he had told police
Morrison was fine at the time. The ABI report was not disclosed
to the defense or the jury. Finally, Myers contacted the Resource
Center in 1991 and said that he had been pressured by law
enforcement officers to testify falsely against McMillian; and
now even the Alabama Attorney General admits that all the
prosecution witnesses against McMillian have recanted their
338. See id. § 15-12-21(e).
339. Innocence and the Death Penalty: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 42-48 (1993) (statement of Bryan A. Stevenson).
340. A summary of the findings of the Resource Center is found in McMillian v.




The work of the Resource Center is remarkable for many
reasons. It illustrates how difficult and time-consuming it is to
prove a wrongful conviction claim in our appellate courts, and it
reveals how inadequately McMillian was represented at his
capital murder trial. In their 1957 book on wrongful convictions,
Judge Jerome Frank and his daughter Barbara Frank described
the "Upper Court Myth" in their book. 1 2 They perceptively
critiqued the still popular notion that if an innocent person is
convicted, the appellate court will surely set the conviction
aside. Appellate courts in fact have numerous limitations on the
scope of their review which prevent them from any de novo re-
view of trial facts or credibility determinations.
The work of the Resource Center also underscores the
amount of time, skill, and specialized knowledge required to
effectively investigate and prepare a capital murder defense. The
trial record does not disclose the extent of the investigation
undertaken by McMillian's trial lawyers or how much time they
spent in Monroeville preparing his defense. There is little ques-
tion, however, that any pretrial investigation on McMillian's
behalf was cursory at best. Some of the information located by
the Resource Center should have been found by McMillian's
lawyers. They should have requested and examined the Taylor
Hardin records, for example, and they should have been able to
establish that McMillian's truck was not a low-rider in Novem-
ber, 1986. The concealment of exculpatory evidence by police and
prosecutors therefore does not wholly excuse the half-hearted
defense presented by McMillian's lawyers.
Based on its discovery of this undisclosed exculpatory and
impeachment evidence, the Resource Center took over the appel-
late representation of McMillian. But the appellate courts were
extraordinarily resistant to McMillian's grounds for appeal.'
341. Letter from Alabama Attorney General Jimmy Evans to Bryan Stevenson,
Executive Director, Alabama Capital Representation Resource Center (Feb. 25, 1993)
(on file with the author). Ironically, the additional exculpatory evidence was mailed
to Stevenson two days after the court reversed McMillian's conviction and death
sentence.
342. JEROME FRANK AND BARBARA FRANK, NoT GUILTY 32-33 (1957).
343. See McMillian v. State, 570 So. 2d 1285 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); McMillian
v. State, 594 So. 2d 1253 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); Ex parte McMillian, 594 So. 2d
1288 (Ala. 1992); McMillian v. State, 594 So. 2d 1289 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992);
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It took McMillian nearly five years and four rounds of appeals to
convince the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that he had
received an unfair trial, even though he had presented some sev-
enteen grounds of appeal to that court within two years of his
conviction.' Indicative of that resistance is the fact that even
after Myers testified that he had perjured himself during
McMillian's trial, the appellate court was unwilling to believe
that McMilhian's conviction had been obtained by perjured testi-
mony.34 The court's response to McMillian was that the credi-
bility of witnesses is for the trier of fact, whose finding is conclu-
sive on appeal.'
The court -could not so easily dismiss McMillian's Brady
violation claims. Through the exceptional legal assistance from
the Resource Center, McMillian proved that his due process
rights were violated by the state's failure to disclose exculpatory
and impeachment evidence. 7 The court concluded that there
was a reasonable probability that had the exculpatory and im-
peachment evidence been disclosed prior to trial, the results of
the proceedings would have been different." On February 23,
1993, the court reversed McMillian's conviction and death sen-
tence and remanded the case for a new trial. 9 On March 2,
1993, McMillian was released from Alabama's Death Row, which
had been his home since July, 1987.'
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
McMillian's story reads like so many other wrongful convic-
tion cases. Police personnel investigated the crime incompetently
and negligently and law enforcement agencies collaborated to
coerce incriminating statements from jailhouse informants who
McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). For a summary of
McMillian's appellate ordeal, see McMillian, 616 So. 2d at 935-36.
344. McMillian, 594 So. 2d at 1253. For a summary of the appellate history, see
McMillian, 616 So. 2d at 935-36.
345. McMillian, 616 So. 2d at 936-41.
346. I1& at 941.
347. Id. at 941-42.
348. Id. at 949.
349. Id. at 933.
350. Peter Applebome, Alabama Releases Man Held On Death Row for Six Years,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1993, at Al.
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were known criminals and liars willing to parrot anything to the
police in exchange for personal deals or reward money. The
prosecution selectively disclosed contradictory statements and
the terms of special agreements between the prosecution and
state witnesses. Because police and prosecutors impeded full dis-
closure of the evidence, McMillian's lawyers could not provide
him effective assistance of counsel. Moreover, because Alabama
does not have an indigent defense program to provide poor peo-
ple with adequate lawyer services, even if McMillian's lawyers
had received the exculpatory information, they would have had
limited time and resources to prepare his defense. All of these
factors made McMillian's trial unfair, his conviction wrongful,
and him a victim. He cannot regain the six years that he was
incarcerated, nor can he live with his family or work in his for-
mer community.
Walter McMillian is lucky to be alive and out of prison. The
criminal justice system did not work for him. He was found
innocent in spite of the criminal justice system." 1 He was for-
tunate to receive postconviction assistance from very able and
diligent counsel and investigators at the Resource Center. With-
out agencies like the Resource Center, McMillian would very
likely still be on Death Row or would by now have been execut-
ed. To date, McMillian has received no form of indemnity from
the state.
Cases like McMillian's will continue to occur until we do
much more to ensure that every criminal defendant receives a
fair trial, with meaningful assistance of counsel not only in the
all-important initial capital trial, but also throughout his or her
appeal. Over seventy years ago, Edwin Borchard, a Yale law
professor, advocated reforms in criminal procedures designed to
reduce the number of wrongful convictions. 2 Among them,
Borchard recommended that (1) no confession be introduced as
evidence unless it was given before a magistrate and in the
presence of witnesses; (2) expert witnesses should be in the
employ of the public and not retained solely by the defense or
351. Many of the wrongful conviction cases discussed in In Spite of Innocence
were corrected by persons outside the criminal justice system. See RADELET ET AL.,
supra note 88, at 279-80.
352. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 278-79.
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prosecution; (3) indigent defendants should have the services of
a public defender; (4) in cases where a conviction may have been
erroneous, an independent investigative body should be appoint-
ed to review the case; (5) appellate courts should be empowered
to review not only the law under which the defendant was con-
victed, but also the facts introduced into evidence against him or
her; (6) no death sentence should issue against a defendant
convicted solely on circumstantial evidence; and (7) the state
should indemnify the accused and publicly vindicate him or
her.' Borchard's proposals have not received broad adoption.
They are worthy of further consideration and would likely have
eliminated some of the wrongful convictions that have occurred
in the last sixty years. But many others would likely still have
fallen through the cracks because Borchard did not address all
the problems of corrupt practices by police or prosecutors or
peijury by witnesses like Myers, Hooks, or Hightower.
Twenty-five years later, the Franks revisited the problem of
wrongful convictions and cautioned us to be wary of the myth of
infallibility."M The wrongful conviction of Walter McMillian is
just another reminder that we are not only fallible, but some-
times overzealous in our attempt to make someone pay for a
crime.
Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam published still another wake-
up call for those who refuse to believe that people are wrongfully
convicted and that some of these movements have been execut-
ed. Their concern over the execution of the innocent persuades
them that we should abandon the death penalty and use long-
term incarceration in the alternative. As much as I am now
persuaded by the wisdom of this conclusion, it seems unlikely
that this nation will move away from its sanction of the death
penalty any time soon.
More recently, Ruth Friedman and Bryan Stevenson have
written a compelling article about capital defense issues in Ala-
bama.' Friedman and Stevenson are correct that improving
capital defense requires (1) the elimination of statutory limits on
353. RADELET ET AL., supra note 88, at 278-79. For a full discussion of
Borchard's proposals, see EDWIN BORCHARD, CoNVICTInG THE INNOCENT: SlnTY-FvE
ACTUAL ]ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 367-78 (1932).
354. FRANK & FRANK, supra note 342, at 199-249.
355. Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 45.
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compensation for appointed counsel in capital cases; (2) improve-
ment of the rates of compensation for appointed counsel; (3)
development of better training for appointed counsel; and (4)
establishment of a statewide public defender office for consulta-
tion services and direct representation." These reforms could
help immensely in improving the trial process by ensuring that
lawyers who are appointed to capital defense cases have the
requisite skill, experience, and time to fully defend the accused.
The reforms proposed by Borchard, the Franks, Radelet,
Bedau and Putnam, and Friedman and Stevenson merit serious
consideration and discussion. They might protect all of us from
similar encounters. Yet even with these reforms, McMillian
probably would have been convicted because law enforcement
officials and the prosecution concealed exculpatory evidence from
the defense with impunity.
If we are serious about reducing the number of wrongful
convictions, we need to make it a crime to conceal exculpatory
evidence. Thus, a rule that places an affirmative duty on law
enforcement personnel and prosecutors to disclose all their evi-
dence to both the defense and the prosecution is essential. It
only makes sense to continue to stack public resources in favor
of the prosecution if we are simply interested in obtaining con-
victions.
Alabama has now adopted an open file policy in response to
numerous cases in which prosecutors failed to disclose exculpa-
tory or impeachment evidence. 7 That policy could still be in-
adequate when documents do not make it into the prosecution
file. A more effective policy would be to criminalize the failure to
disclose such reports and make proof of nondisclosure an auto-
matic ground for reversal of a conviction and death sentence. It
is time to take the problem of wrongful convictions seriously. An
exculpatory rule and criminal prosecutions of persons who par-
ticipate in concealing exculpatory evidence would give a weak
Brady rule significance."
356. Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 45, at 40-59.
357. Ex parte Monk, 557 So. 2d 832 (Ala. 1989).
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We also need to be far more suspicious of testimony from
interested witnesses who themselves may have committed the
crime or who make deals or receive reward money in exchange
for their testimony. Why do we repeatedly believe the likes of
Ralph Myers or David Harris, whose lies incriminated Randall
Adams? 9 Such witnesses have incentives to lie, and they are
under the coercive control of agents of the criminal justice sys-
tem who have demonstrated a willingness to conceal exculpatory
evidence. It is so easy to fabricate such evidence that maybe we
cannot trust such testimony at all. Or perhaps we should require
that it be independently corroborated. As long as we treat such
evidence as credible, we will continue to discover that another
interested witness has lied.
Agencies like the Alabama Capital Representation Resource
Center are indispensable to our efforts to reduce the number of
wrongful convictions. The Resource Center serves in the role of a
private' attorney general and is independent of the criminal
justice system. Because of its important work, it should have a
method available to obtain reimbursement for its reasonable
attorney's and investigator's fees. Such agencies help oversee
agents of the criminal justice system who too frequently abuse
the rights of the criminally accused and conceal the truth.
McMillian's ordeal continued in the appellate courts and his
experience makes a strong case for effective legal representation
for the criminally accused throughout postconviction proceedings
until all legal grounds for appeal have been exhausted. Only
then is the indigent criminal defendant accorded an equal oppor-
tunity to prove his innocence.
As for the issue of innocence, there should be no time limit
on the presentation of new evidence relating to the innocence of
the defendant. We will likely never know if James Adams was in
fact innocent of killing Edgar Brown, or if Roger Coleman or
Leonel Herrera were innocent of their alleged crimes. They were
executed in 1984, 1992, and 1993, respectively. °
Alabama gives defendants only thirty days to present new
359. For a full discussion of the Adams case, see RANDALL D. ADAMS ET AL., AD-
AMS v. TEXAS (1991).
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evidence that might reverse their convictions."' Sixteen states
require new trial motions based on new evidence be filed within
sixty days of the judgment; others have time limits from one to
three years.6 2 Nine states have no time limits." Thus, an
opportunity to present new evidence depends significantly on the
place where one is convicted. That does not make sense. We
need a federal rule that places no limit on the presentation of
evidence of innocence.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are too many Tom Robinsons among us. Walter
McMillian was fortunate. Before reading about what happened
to him, I was not aware of the frequency of wrongful convictions
or the haste and zeal with which we have been willing to convict
and sometimes execute some criminally accused. Hardly a day
passes without some reference to proposals shortening the time
between sentencing and execution. Here, I have in mind the
continual increase in restrictions on federal habeas corpus relief
and the procedural emphasis of the Court.' We have some-
how forgotten about the possibility of the substantive innocence
of the accused and that no clock or procedural error should pre-
clude substantive proof of innocence. Moreover, any haste and
zeal to execute a convicted person seems grossly inappropriate
within a criminal justice system that is prone to error or inten-
tional abuse.
I shall reserve my full critique of our use of the death penal-
ty for another project, but here wish to make plain my doubts
that the death penalty can be applied without arbitrariness or
racial discrimination in our criminal justice system. Meanwhile,
other mockingbirds are crying out for our help.'
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